diff --git a/apps/web/lib/verify-session.ts b/apps/web/lib/verify-session.ts
index 2a4863450..460332cf7 100644
--- a/apps/web/lib/verify-session.ts
+++ b/apps/web/lib/verify-session.ts
@@ -14,34 +14,164 @@ function isLocalDevRequest(request: Request): boolean {
 	}
 }
 
-// middleware.ts only checks the cookie is present; metered/proxy routes must verify it server-side.
-export async function hasVerifiedSession(request: Request): Promise<boolean> {
-	if (isLocalDevRequest(request)) {
-		return true
-	}
+// In-process cache for verified sessions. The cookie is the identity; hashing it
+// gives a fixed-length cache key without decoding the session. Short TTL keeps
+// revocation latency low; promise deduplication absorbs burst traffic without
+// fanning out to N concurrent backend hits.
+const POSITIVE_TTL_MS = 10_000
+const NEGATIVE_TTL_MS = 5_000
+const MAX_ENTRIES = 1_000
 
-	const cookie = request.headers.get("cookie")
-	if (!cookie) {
-		return false
+type Entry = {
+	value: boolean
+	expiresAt: number
+	inflight?: Promise<boolean>
+}
+
+type ComputeResult =
+	| { kind: "valid" } // session present, user is set
+	| { kind: "no_user" } // valid response but no user (cached negatively)
+	| { kind: "unauthorized" } // 401/403 — definitive: invalidate, do not cache
+	| { kind: "transient" } // 5xx/timeout/parse — fall back to stale; do not overwrite
+
+const cache = new Map<string, Entry>()
+
+async function hashKey(cookie: string): Promise<string> {
+	// SubtleCrypto is available in Cloudflare Workers and Node 20+; this repo
+	// requires node >=20 per the root package.json engines field.
+	const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(cookie)
+	const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", bytes)
+	return Array.from(new Uint8Array(digest))
+		.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
+		.join("")
+}
+
+function touch(key: string, entry: Entry) {
+	// LRU: re-insert to move the key to the most-recent end of Map's insertion order.
+	cache.delete(key)
+	cache.set(key, entry)
+	if (cache.size > MAX_ENTRIES) {
+		// Oldest entry is the first key in iteration order; drop it.
+		const oldest = cache.keys().next().value
+		if (oldest !== undefined) cache.delete(oldest)
 	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Manually invalidate the cache entry for a cookie. Useful on logout or
+ * after a server-side session revocation.
+ */
+export async function invalidateSession(cookie: string): Promise<void> {
+	if (!cookie) return
+	cache.delete(await hashKey(cookie))
+}
 
+async function performVerification(cookie: string): Promise<ComputeResult> {
 	try {
 		const response = await fetch(`${getBackendUrl()}/api/auth/get-session`, {
 			headers: { cookie },
 			redirect: "error",
 			cache: "no-store",
 		})
+		if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
+			return { kind: "unauthorized" }
+		}
 		if (!response.ok) {
-			return false
+			return { kind: "transient" }
 		}
 		const session: unknown = await response.json()
-		return Boolean(
+		const hasUser = Boolean(
 			session &&
 				typeof session === "object" &&
 				"user" in session &&
 				session.user,
 		)
+		return hasUser ? { kind: "valid" } : { kind: "no_user" }
 	} catch {
+		return { kind: "transient" }
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Look up or compute the verification result for a cookie. Concurrent callers
+ * for the same cookie share a single in-flight fetch.
+ *
+ * - valid: caches as positive (POSITIVE_TTL_MS).
+ * - no_user: caches as negative (NEGATIVE_TTL_MS).
+ * - unauthorized: invalidates any prior entry; returns false; does not cache.
+ * - transient: returns the last cached value if any (stale-while-error),
+ *   otherwise false. Does not overwrite the cache.
+ */
+async function getOrCompute(cookie: string): Promise<boolean> {
+	const key = await hashKey(cookie)
+	const now = Date.now()
+	const existing = cache.get(key)
+	if (existing && existing.expiresAt > now && !existing.inflight) {
+		touch(key, existing)
+		return existing.value
+	}
+	if (existing?.inflight) {
+		return existing.inflight
+	}
+	// Snapshot stale value before placeholder overwrites it — needed for
+	// stale-while-error on transient failures after TTL expiry.
+	const staleSnapshot = existing ? { value: existing.value } : undefined
+	const inflight = (async () => {
+		const result = await performVerification(cookie)
+		switch (result.kind) {
+			case "valid": {
+				const entry: Entry = {
+					value: true,
+					expiresAt: Date.now() + POSITIVE_TTL_MS,
+				}
+				cache.set(key, entry)
+				touch(key, entry)
+				return true
+			}
+			case "no_user": {
+				const entry: Entry = {
+					value: false,
+					expiresAt: Date.now() + NEGATIVE_TTL_MS,
+				}
+				cache.set(key, entry)
+				touch(key, entry)
+				return false
+			}
+			case "unauthorized": {
+				cache.delete(key)
+				return false
+			}
+			case "transient": {
+				// Stale-while-error: return last known value if any.
+				if (staleSnapshot) return staleSnapshot.value
+				const prior = cache.get(key)
+				// prior is the placeholder here; prefer snapshot.
+				if (prior && prior.value !== false) return prior.value
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+	})()
+	const placeholder: Entry = { value: false, expiresAt: 0, inflight }
+	cache.set(key, placeholder)
+	try {
+		return await inflight
+	} catch (error) {
+		cache.delete(key)
+		throw error
+	} finally {
+		const settled = cache.get(key)
+		if (settled) settled.inflight = undefined
+	}
+}
+
+// middleware.ts only checks the cookie is present; metered/proxy routes must verify it server-side.
+export async function hasVerifiedSession(request: Request): Promise<boolean> {
+	if (isLocalDevRequest(request)) {
+		return true
+	}
+	const cookie = request.headers.get("cookie")
+	if (!cookie) {
 		return false
 	}
+	return getOrCompute(cookie)
 }