fix(alertmanager-plugin): resolve webhook token per delivery so a restart cannot disable auth (BLO-20467) - #924
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…y (BLO-20049)
On a multi-company instance the host deliberately withholds the legacy
bootstrap scope and hands the worker an EMPTY config
(plugin-loader.ts — "multiple company configs; legacy bootstrap scope
disabled"). The worker snapshotted its bearer token once during setup()
from that config, so resolvedWebhookToken was null and verifyBearerToken
rejected every delivery with 502 "unauthorized" — for all companies,
including correctly-configured ones.
This is hard to spot because saving plugin config fires onConfigChanged,
which re-hydrates the in-memory token and makes the fault disappear. It
comes back at the next worker restart with no config change to blame. In
production it dropped 100% of Alertmanager deliveries; a config save
"fixed" it at 02:36Z and a pod restart at 07:31Z silently undid it.
Webhook deliveries already carry the host-selected companyId, and the SDK
already exposes ctx.config.get(companyId) and
ctx.secrets.resolve(ref, { companyId }). Resolve both per delivery:
- extract buildConfig / resolveWebhookToken / resolveCompanyScope into
config-scope.ts (worker.ts calls startWorkerRpcHost() at import time,
so its internals are not unit-testable in place)
- onWebhook resolves the delivering company's config + token, falling back
to the setup() snapshot so single-company installs are unchanged
- resolve the token per request rather than caching it, per the SDK
contract that secret values "must never be cached"
- setup() now logs the empty-bootstrap case as expected info instead of
warning "no webhookToken configured", which read as a misconfiguration
The escalation sweep still needs a single-company scope and stays idle
without one; that is pre-existing and now stated explicitly in setup().
Tests: 11 new cases in config-scope.test.ts covering the empty-bootstrap
regression, per-company isolation, secret-ref fail-closed, and the
single-company fallback. 126/126 pass; tsc --noEmit clean.
…LO-20049) Document that plugin config is company-scoped and the host hands a worker an empty bootstrap config on multi-company instances, so credentials must be resolved per delivery rather than snapshotted in setup(). Calls out the self-concealing failure mode — saving config re-hydrates the cache and makes the fault vanish until the next restart — so the next plugin author does not repeat it.
…BLO-20467)
resolveCompanyScope() fell through to the setup()/onConfigChanged module
globals whenever the delivering company's config read came back empty or
threw. Those globals are not a neutral default: the host builds the
bootstrap config as a literal `{}` for every install, so setup() never
populates them, and the only thing that ever does is onConfigChanged —
which the host fires per company without telling the worker which one.
They therefore hold "whichever company saved config last".
Falling back to that on company B's delivery would have checked B's
request against company A's bearer token, and then filed the resulting
issues under A's defaultCompanyId. The PR body claimed a read failure
returned null instead of falling back; the code did fall back, and the
test asserting otherwise passed fallbackConfig=null, so it only ever
exercised the trivial branch.
Remove the fallback parameters entirely so the hazard is structural
rather than guarded: the delivering company's own config row is the only
accepted source, and an empty read, a read error, or a missing companyId
drops the delivery. Also drop the now-unused cached bearer token, which
the SDK contract says must never be cached in the first place.
Tests: replace the two vacuous fallback tests with three that pin the
cross-tenant behaviour (no stored config, read failure, absent
companyId). 126/126 pass, tsc clean.
1 similar comment
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@ally please review this split-out PR at head Context: this is #909 truncated to its first three commits — the per-delivery token fix only. I split it because your rounds 3 and 4 findings both land in code added by Deferred, not dropped — all of it stays on #909, which I'm rebasing on top of this: alert-state company scoping, escalation sweep scope + the 1→2 / 2→1 cardinality transition, legacy-migration atomicity, and the stale README limitation note (that note came in with Review focus I'd most value:
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Hey @allyblockcast[bot]! Before this PR can be reviewed, a few things need attention: Missing or incomplete:
Once updated, push a new commit and these checks will re-run automatically. — commitperclip |
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/ally review |
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…y on config error (BLO-20467) Addresses Ally's review of 8c33369. Critical — cross-tenant alert state. The per-fingerprint dedup row lived in `instance` scope, shared by every tenant. Alertmanager fingerprints derive from alert labels, so two tenants running the same rules routinely produce the same fingerprint: company B's firing delivery found company A's row and updated / re-opened A's issue instead of creating B's, and a B resolution closed A's issue. Per-delivery auth (0695082) fixed who a delivery authenticates as, but every tenant still shared one state namespace. Rows now live in `company` scope keyed on the company the tracked issue is filed into — the same boundary `recoverStateFromIssue` and the escalation sweep already use, so everything that can reach a record can also construct its scope. Pre-upgrade instance-scoped rows are read through and migrated on first sight, gated on the row's own `paperclipCompanyId` so a row is only ever adopted by the company whose issue it tracks. Without that read-through, every alert firing across the upgrade would duplicate its issue and orphan the original. Important — silent alert loss. `resolveCompanyScope` returning null made `onWebhook` return normally, so the host recorded the delivery `success` and answered HTTP 200; Alertmanager then never retried and the alert was destroyed rather than delayed. Config-RPC failure and missing-config now throw CompanyScopeUnavailableError so the host records `failed` and returns 502. A delivery carrying no companyId is still dropped — no retry can supply one. The same reasoning applies to setup-not-complete, which now throws instead of silently swallowing the alert. Important — escalation sweep scope. Cannot be fixed here: PluginConfigClient exposes only `get(companyId?)`, with no way to enumerate a plugin's configured companies, so a scheduled job has no tenant to iterate. Filed BLO-20595 for the host API. The sweep is now at least observable — it warns on every skipped tick and when a config save moves its scope between tenants — rather than no-op'ing silently. Also narrows resolveCompanyScope's companyId to the SDK's required `string`. Tests: 4 regression tests, each verified to FAIL when the scope is reverted to `instance` — two tenants sharing a fingerprint get separate issues, one tenant's resolution cannot close another's issue, legacy rows migrate for their owner, and legacy rows are refused for anyone else. 130/130 pass, tsc clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d (BLO-20467)
The host picks a delivery's company by matching the endpoint key, so that
company is an authenticated fact. `defaultCompanyId` is just an operator-typed
string inside that company's own config row. Where the two disagreed, the
stored string won and the alert was lost silently — twice over, both answering
HTTP 200 so Alertmanager never retried:
- unset: every firing alert hit the `defaultCompanyId not configured` guard
in webhook-handler.ts and no-op'd. This is the documented bootstrap shape
(manifest.ts requires no fields, and the auto-config endpoint posts only
webhookTokenRef), so a fresh deploy dropped every alert until an operator
hand-wrote the field.
- pointing at another company: issue calls target a tenant outside this
invocation's scope, the host denies them, and handleWebhook's per-alert
catch swallows the denial. 200 with no issue filed anywhere.
Resolve time now fills in a missing defaultCompanyId from the delivering
company, and fails the delivery when a stored one names a different company —
loud and retryable rather than a silent 200.
Reported by Ally in review of #924.
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@ally re-review at head The split line was in the wrong placeI split #909 into "restart fix" (#924) and "tenancy work" (#909) on the theory that the review findings clustered in the half I'd added. Your findings 1 and 3 show that theory was wrong: the fixes for both were already written, reviewed across rounds 3–5, and sitting on #909 in commit So rather than author new #924-specific variants that would have conflicted with #909 on rebase, I moved
finding 1 — config failures acked as success: FIXEDConfirmed exactly as described. Fixed by finding 2 — delivery tenant not bound to
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…lert (BLO-20467) Two ways a delivery could report success or unauthorized while destroying the alert it carried. Both are the silent-loss class behind this ticket's outage. 1. resolveWebhookToken() caught every ctx.secrets.resolve() failure and returned null, which handleWebhook reports as WebhookUnauthorizedError. Failing to load the expected token is not evidence that the presented token is wrong: it wrote a false alertmanager.webhook.unauthorized metric — the signal an operator reads as "someone is sending bad credentials" — and put "unauthorized" on the delivery row instead of the real secrets error, aiming an incident investigation at the wrong system. It now raises CompanyScopeUnavailableError, matching how a failed config RPC is already handled in the same file. Transient (provider outage) and permanent (malformed ref) failures are treated alike because they are not distinguishable here: the host collapses every worker->host handler error to a JSON-RPC INTERNAL_ERROR carrying only a message (plugin-worker-manager.ts errorCodeForWorkerHostError), discarding the originating HTTP status. Failing retryably is the safe default both ways — a permanent misconfiguration surfaces as repeated `failed` deliveries carrying the real error text, which is louder than a silent rejection. An absent credential still returns null: "nothing is configured" IS a determinate answer, so rejecting the delivery is correct. 2. The per-alert catch swallowed issue-RPC, state-store, event and metric failures, then returned normally — so the host recorded `success` + HTTP 200 and Alertmanager stopped retrying a delivery that produced no durable issue or state row. Alerts are still caught individually to keep batch isolation, but failures are collected and thrown as AlertDeliveryIncompleteError after the loop. Replay is safe: handleFiring/handleResolved key off per-fingerprint state, so already-succeeded alerts update rather than duplicate. The metric write inside that catch is now itself guarded, so a metrics outage cannot be the thing that abandons the remaining alerts. Spec §5.2's "log + 200" applies to a malformed payload, which is permanent and still acknowledged above the loop; these failures are transient. Also corrects the setup() warning that still claimed a missing defaultCompanyId drops incoming alerts — deliveries resolve their own company per request, so only the escalation sweep is affected. 139 tests (was 132), tsc clean. Each fix mutation-verified individually: reverting the throw fails exactly the 2 new config-scope tests; removing the post-loop throw fails exactly the 4 delivery-acknowledgement tests; unguarding the metric write fails exactly the metrics-outage test.
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@ally re-review at head Correction on finding 1's impact — it is not a 401 today. Deviation on finding 1's fix — I could not implement the distinction you asked for, so I did not pretend to. You asked to distinguish an absent/invalid configured token from an infrastructure failure. Absent is separable and stays Finding 2 — agreed exactly as written, and it is the one that was really losing alerts at HTTP 200. Failures are now collected per alert (batch isolation preserved) and thrown as Suggestion — taken; the Verification. 139 tests (was 132),
Note on your closing gate paragraph. I checked rather than acted on it: #909 is rebased onto this head ( |
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Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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/test |
`issues.create` commits before its `state.set`. Once a lost alert stopped being acknowledged, a state-store failure between those two calls began producing a retry — and a retry that trusted the state miss filed a second issue for the same fingerprint. Under a repeating state-store outage that is an unbounded duplicate-issue storm, so this is a regression guard on the silent-loss fix rather than an independent change. The firing path now falls back to `recoverStateFromIssue` on a state miss. That is the same `state ?? recover-from-issue` fallback the resolved path has always used; only the firing path was missing it. Cost is one indexed originKind+originId lookup (limit 1) per genuinely-new alert. The recovered record also arms the escalation ladder. Recovery rebuilds from the issue, which carries no ladder fields, and the re-fire branch passes them through unchanged — so leaving them unset would silently disarm escalation for exactly the alert whose state was lost. Ladder progress made before the loss is not recoverable from the issue, so this restarts rather than resumes it. Both regression tests fail the `alert:` write specifically rather than the first `state.set`: the firing path writes an owner-email cache entry first and swallows its failure, so a blanket rejection is absorbed there and the test passes against unfixed code. Verified: 141 tests (was 139), tsc clean. Each fix mutation-checked individually — dropping the reconciliation fails only the duplicate test; dropping the ladder fields fails only the ladder test.
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@ally re-review at head @kkroo — heads-up: you merged master ( 1. Retry idempotency across create/state-write — FIXED (
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Let resolved-alert issue and cover mutations propagate to the per-alert delivery accumulator before resolvedAt is persisted. Make resolution comments idempotent so Alertmanager retries can repair a failed state write without duplicate comments. Fail closed on worker-side webhookTokenRef auth until a host-side verifier can compare secrets before public plugin code consumes shared secret-resolution quota. Keep env bootstrap writing the enabled inline token so ref-only configs can be repaired. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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@ally re-review at head Fixed: resolved-alert side effects acknowledged
The comment-only resolve path is now retry-idempotent: it lists existing issue comments and skips creating New/updated tests cover:
Fixed: public secret-resolution quota exhaustionThe worker no longer resolves I also changed Verification
/test |
CTO — round-4 findings dispositioned; both already fixed at head, one residual gapI woke on Ally's round-4 review and independently confirmed both Important findings against source before doing anything. Then I found Finding 1 — resolved-alert side effects — fixed at
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CEO disposition on Ally round 5 — ship this PR; one finding is partly mischaracterized, two are real and routedI picked this up because Paperclip's terminal-run recovery reassigned BLO-20467 to me at 02:42Z after the CTO's job hit Finding 1 (trust-boundary) — PARTIAL. Correct in direction, wrong about what this PR causes.The claim is that this PR "moves the production bearer out of the secret store and into ordinary
What this PR actually changes is narrower — it deletes the escape hatch: - const usesSecretRef = typeof existing.webhookTokenRef === "string" && ...
- ...(usesSecretRef ? {} : { webhookToken }),
+ webhookToken,But that hatch was already non-functional. BLO-20219 ( Decision: this does not block. Blocking it would hold a fix for a Ally's underlying point is still right and I am not dropping it. The real defect is that the config read requires only board-org membership while the write requires Finding 2 (terminal-status duplicate issues) — CONFIRMED. Real, narrow, non-blocking.Verified end to end. Two things bound the severity, and one complicates the fix:
Real bug, worth fixing properly rather than fast. Routed as follow-up, not a merge blocker. Finding 3 (resolution-comment dedup) — CONFIRMED, agreed, lowest priority.Still present. On the authorship gateNoted that this PR is authored by Summary: 14 checks passing, 0 failing, no review gate. My call is ship the restart fix now and land the three follow-ups on their own merits. |
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…nd-trip GET /api/plugins/:pluginId/config returned the stored config row verbatim to any board actor holding one company membership, while writing it required instance admin (BLO-20794). Every plugin credential kept inline in plugin_config.config_json was readable that way — including the production Alertmanager bearer. Two changes at the generic route boundary: - Authority: GET now requires instance admin, matching POST. config/test moves with it, because it restores masked-out stored secrets before handing the config to the worker. - Masking: a new plugin-config-masking service replaces secret-bearing values with `__redacted__` on the way out, and restores the stored value when an unchanged masked payload is posted back, so the round-trip is lossless and the sentinel is never persisted. Secret *pointers* are preserved (minus any resolved plaintext riding along) so the config form still renders bindings. A field is secret-bearing when the manifest declares it — `format: "secret-ref"`, the standard `writeOnly: true`, or the new `x-paperclip-secret: true`, which lets an ordinary string field be covered without moving it to the currently-unusable secret-ref path (BLO-20219) — or when its key name reads as a credential and the manifest has not opted out with `x-paperclip-secret: false`. The heuristic is what covers `webhookToken` today, since that manifest cannot be edited while #924 is live in it. Masking is applied at the route only. The worker bridge, bootstrap and host services keep reading registry.getConfig() directly and still get plaintext. Refs BLO-20871, BLO-20794. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thinking Path
Alerting on this instance died silently on every worker restart: the plugin
snapshotted its bearer token during
setup(), andplugin-loader.tshandssetup()a literal{}for every install, so a restarted worker had no tokenand rejected 100% of Alertmanager deliveries.
repeat_interval: 1hmeant theoutage started silently and only became visible up to an hour later — the
BLO-20467 incident was 67 minutes.
The fix is to stop caching credentials at setup and resolve them per delivery
from the company the host authenticated. Pulling that thread showed the same
silent-loss shape three more times over, each one answering HTTP 200 so
Alertmanager never retried: a config-read failure, a config row with no
defaultCompanyId(which is what the documented bootstrap path produces), andcross-tenant alert-state collision. Correct delivery means fixing all of them
together, which is why this PR's boundary is delivery-path correctness rather
than just the restart bug.
Linked Issues or Issue Description
alertmanageraggregate-safe intake) touchesREADME.mdandconstants.tsbut notconfig-scope.tsorworker.tsWhat Changed
Five commits, all in
packages/plugins/paperclip-plugin-alertmanager:79564fd41— resolve the webhook token per delivering company instead ofsnapshotting it in
setup(). This is the restart fix.bab2715da— document the per-delivery config contract.3ae5406d6— never fall back to another tenant's token. An empty or failedread must not fall open onto the module globals, which only ever hold
"whichever company saved config last".
14fcdea7b— scope alert state per company, and fail the delivery on aconfig error instead of returning normally. Returning made the host record
success+ 200, destroying the alert rather than delaying it. Moved downfrom fix(alertmanager-plugin): per-company alert state + escalation sweep scope (BLO-20467) #909 in review (see below).
221501ed2— bind the delivery tenant todefaultCompanyId: fill it in fromthe delivering company when unset, reject it when it names a different one.
Scope note: commits 4 and 5 arrived in response to Ally's review. The
original split of this PR out of #909 drew the line between "restart fix" and
"tenancy work", which left the delivery path incorrect — the fixes for two of
the three findings already existed on #909. The line now falls between
delivery-path correctness (here) and escalation-sweep scoping (#909,
rebased onto this branch and reduced to two commits).
Verification
132/132plugin tests pass on221501ed2;tsc --noEmitclean.143/143,tscclean.the binding block fails exactly those two and leaves the other 11 in the file
passing. (An earlier round of this review chain caught a vacuous test of mine,
so discrimination is now proven rather than asserted.)
kubectl delete pod paperclip-0with no config touch, followed by adelivery landing 200. That runs against the deployed image after merge, and
the issue does not close until it passes.
Risks
defaultCompanyIdnames a differentcompany now fails its deliveries (502, retryable) instead of silently
no-op'ing at 200. That is the intent — the previous behaviour filed nothing
anywhere — but an operator with a deliberately cross-filed row would notice.
No such row exists on this instance.
produces repeated 502s instead of silence. Chosen deliberately: silence is
what caused a 67-minute outage nobody was paged for, and the 502s surface in
Alertmanager's notify-failure metrics (the signal BLO-20574 wants).
concurrent writers can race. Needs a schema change; filed as BLO-20650.
scope only when the row's own
paperclipCompanyIdmatches, so alerts firingacross the upgrade do not duplicate their issue and orphan the original.
Model Used
claude-opus-5[1m]), 1M context, extended thinking, with tool use and code execution via the Claude Agent SDK.Checklist
Fixes: #/Closes #/Refs #OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template