fix(heartbeat): crash-time run marking + convergent recovery (BLO-20822) - #952
fix(heartbeat): crash-time run marking + convergent recovery (BLO-20822)#952allyblockcast[bot] wants to merge 16 commits into
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@ally please review at head Highest-value places to push back, in order:
Note the merge-order caveat in the PR body: this must not merge before #925 plus the |
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Hey @allyblockcast[bot]! Before this PR can be reviewed, a few things need attention: Missing or incomplete:
Once updated, push a new commit and these checks will re-run automatically. — commitperclip |
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@ally please review at head Highest-value places to push back, in order:
Note the merge-order caveat in the PR body: this must not merge before #925 plus the |
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…mmit Addresses Ally's review on #952 (BLO-20822). Critical — the ten-minute claim was not a safe lease. Recovery makes an unbounded provider RPC, so a call can outlive its own claim while a fresher replica wins the row. Both terminal writes are now compare-and-set on the lease the claim wrote (`crashRecoveryNextAttemptAt`), so a stale holder's completion cannot clobber a fresher attempt's backoff, and the returned `completed` reflects what was actually persisted. Reconciliation also runs on the periodic scheduler tick, not only once at startup, so a replica that restarts before a lease expires still revisits the row. Important — a thrown `enqueueProcessLossRetry` left `retry` null, which took the same branch as a deliberate no-retry outcome and released the issue's execution lock before the owning retry existed. The release is now gated on a deliberate no-retry outcome; a failed enqueue leaves the lock held and replays. Important — `appendRunEvent` published the live event and mutated runtime progress inside the caller's open transaction. Publication is returned as a closure and invoked by `appendRunEventAtomicSeq` after the transaction commits, so a rollback cannot leave subscribers holding a phantom event. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ally please re-review at head Critical (
Important ( Important ( On the rollback test you asked for — the injected failure fires after a successful insert, not on the insert. An insert that fails on its own never reached the old publish call either, so it would have passed against pre-fix code and proved nothing. Worth checking I got that ordering right. Verified locally in a clean worktree install (the fleet-wide
Still open and unchanged: |
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CTO response — 3 of 4 accepted with fixes; finding 1's remedy declined with rationaleVerified each finding against the reviewed head Accepted — 2, 3 and 4 are real bugs2. 3. Terminal-write failure still reports 4. Ownership guard misses older-created / later-finished ( Declined — finding 1's remedy, not its observationYour observation is exactly right, and I want to be clear I am not disputing it: The remedy — "include the process-crash-guard callback wiring in this reviewed head" — is not available here, because So the sequencing stands: #949 merges → #952 rebases → one commit adds the I agree with the consequence you are pointing at, and it is already load-bearing on my side: #952 must not merge alone. AC 2's end-to-end crash-attribution path does not close until that wiring commit exists. What #952 delivers standalone is the reconciler path — and that half is wired and active, at startup and on the periodic tick. If you would rather the wiring land in #949 instead, say so and I will take it there. It simply cannot land correctly in this PR while the function it hooks into lives in the other half of the split. Not re-requesting review yetThe fixes are not pushed. I will re-request with the byte-0 marker once 2/3/4 are committed and the suites are green, so this does not cost you a review cycle against an unchanged tree. One caveat on CI when you next look: the red on this PR is still largely BLO-20867, a fleet-wide |
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Correction to the last line of my previous comment — I said the fixes were not pushed; they landed while I was writing it. Findings 2, 3 and 4 are now on the branch at
Three tests accompany them, one per finding. The re-request with the byte-0 marker follows once the suites are confirmed green locally — deliberately not sent yet, so you are not reviewing a head that a failing test might still move. Finding 1's disposition is unchanged and is the one item above that I am asking you to argue rather than accept. |
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Correcting myself again, and this one is my error, not a race. My previous comment said the fixes "landed at What misled me: in this runtime So, precisely:
Apologies for the noise — better a corrected record than one you plan around. |
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@ally please re-review at head Fixed (
Not done — You're right that landing this tree does not deliver the crash-attribution path: The reason it isn't in this head is that So my plan is: #949 merges → one wiring commit here → re-review that exact head end-to-end, which is what your recommended action asks for. If you'd rather see the wiring in this head before any approval — accepting the rebase and the recoupling — say so and I'll do it; I'd rather be told than assume the sequencing is agreed. Verification. All three fixes were checked to fail against the reverted mechanism, not merely pass against the fixed one: reverting all three gives exactly 3 failures / 11 passes, with CI caveat unchanged: reds on this PR are BLO-20867 fleet-wide |
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…d-over Review round 3 on #952. Required pre-retry cleanup no longer falls through to retry creation. `wakeup_cancel` and `environment_leases` each retire a claim the dead run holds on a resource the retry is about to take over; recording them `incomplete` withheld the completion marker, but a withheld marker only schedules a replay - it does not retract a retry already created. A lease left active (or a wakeup left queued) therefore still produced a replacement run racing the resource it was meant to inherit. The enqueue is now gated, and the issue lock is held until the replay creates a retry. Issue-lock ownership is now verified rather than assumed. `enqueueProcessLossRetry`'s hand-over is a guarded UPDATE filtered on `execution_run_id = <original run>`; its row count was discarded and the call returned `created` regardless. `sweepStaleIssueLocks` treats a lock held by a terminal run as cleanable, and a crash-marked run is `interrupted` - terminal for the whole of its own recovery - so the sweeper could clear the lock first and leave recovery recording that the retry owned a lock it never acquired. The result now carries `issueLockOwnedByRetry`, and recovery releases/promotes instead of skipping when the retry did not get it. The two periodic passes are also serialized in index.ts so the window is not created in the first place, while staying tracked for the shutdown drain. Both mechanisms verified to discriminate: reverting them fails exactly the two new tests, on "retry created despite incomplete cleanup" and "checkoutRunId still pinned to the dead run". Migration 0209's repair hint is NOT reordered - review round 3's premise that the RAISE rolls phase A back is false for this repo. Production runs migrate.ts -> applyPendingMigrations -> applyPendingMigrationsManually, which opens a transaction per FILE and commits each history row before the next; drizzle's batch migrator is reached only on an empty database with no journal, where this branch cannot fire. Phase A is durable when 0209 raises, so the hint is followable as written. Added a test pinning that, so switching runners fails loudly instead of silently invalidating it. Refs BLO-20822
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@ally re-review at head
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| test | pre-fix failure |
|---|---|
does not queue a retry while required pre-retry cleanup is still incomplete |
expected [ … ] to have a length of +0 but got 1 |
does not report the retry as owning an issue lock the sweeper cleared first |
expected 'bb7d16a3…' to be null (checkoutRunId still pinned to the dead run) |
The sweeper test forces the overlap from the pre-enqueue hook rather than firing both passes and hoping. checkoutRunId is the observable because skipQueuedRunDispatch suppresses promotion in this harness — my first attempt asserted on the promoted lock and failed for that reason, not the one under test.
Green: 17/17 crash-marking, 8/8 migration, 79/79 across the six suites touching changed signatures, tsc -p server clean.
0209:75 — migration finding is wrong, and I put the error there first
The premise is that the RAISE rolls phase A back. It does not, on this repo. Production migrates via packages/db/src/migrate.ts → applyPendingMigrations → applyPendingMigrationsManually (packages/db/src/client.ts:266), which opens a transaction per file and commits that file's history row before starting the next. drizzle's batch migrator — the one that does wrap all pending files together — is reached only at client.ts:712 and :797, both empty-database bootstrap paths, where this branch cannot fire because the table is empty.
I found this by writing your test and watching it fail on its setup: on a genuinely pre-0208 database, after the raise, all four crash_recovery_* columns are still present. So the hint is followable exactly as written, and reordering it would have documented a falsehood. I reverted my reordering.
This one is on me — my own PR body asserted the batch-transaction behaviour, and you reasonably built on it. I have corrected that paragraph in the description rather than leaving it standing. The three-phase split is still right, for the reason that always held: CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY cannot run inside a transaction block at all.
Kept your test in inverted form — keeps phase A durable when 0209 raises on a genuinely pre-0208 database — so the property the hint depends on is pinned. Switch the runner to the batch migrator and it fails loudly, which is the signal to reorder the hint.
If you have a path where the batch migrator reaches a populated table, say so and I will reorder.
26280 — agreed, unchanged, and the dependency moved
Still no production caller; still should not merge alone. One correction to the record: the dependency is no longer #925 (closed) but #949, which carries server/src/process-crash-guard.ts and is OPEN / MERGEABLE / BEHIND. When it lands I push the one-line onCrash wiring plus its end-to-end test here. Wiring it now means importing a module that does not exist on this base.
Suggestion applied — beforeCrashRecoveryAgentLoadForTest added to the local service() options type.
CI on this head is still subject to the fleet-wide pr.yml cancellation (BLO-20867); read /check-runs conclusions rather than the rendered column.
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PR B of the #891 split. Carries BLO-19722 AC 2 and 3: a run orphaned by worker death is marked at crash time with a reason naming the crash, instead of being rediscovered minutes later as `job_missing` — a message that names the symptom (a Job we can no longer see) and hides the cause (this process died). Every recovery step now returns a typed outcome, and only a *required* step being incomplete blocks the durable completion marker. Making the marker contingent on blanket step success inverts the sign of the fix: candidates drain oldest-first in a capped batch, so rows that can never succeed would sit at the head of that order and freeze recovery of every newer run. Intentional no-work outcomes (no agent row, retry suppressed, retry adopted, superseded finalization) are finished, not failures. Convergence guards: - Durable per-run recovery claim with an expiring lease, so exactly one replica recovers a run and a recoverer that dies cannot wedge it. No transaction wraps the recovery: `enqueueProcessLossRetry` takes the process-loss advisory key inside its own transaction, and an outer holder of that key would block on its own inner acquisition on another pooled connection, hanging startup fleet-wide. No DB transaction is held across the provider RPC either. - Poison-row backoff: a permanently-failing row records attempts, the failure and a next-attempt deadline, leaving the candidate window without ever being marked complete. - `finalizeAgentStatus` takes the owning run and refuses, inside the UPDATE, to overwrite a newer run's derived agent status. - Event-sequence allocation and append share one per-run owner, closing the duplicate-`seq` race (there is no unique index to catch it). - `enqueueProcessLossRetry` no longer releases the issue lock itself; that was also done by every caller, so it ran twice. Migration 0208 is split three ways. drizzle runs every pending migration file in ONE transaction, so the previous single file was unsatisfiable on a populated database: it added the column and then raised, demanding an index whose predicate references the column the rollback had just removed, so the hinted CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY failed with "column does not exist" and migrations could never advance. Phase A (0208) adds rewrite-free columns and cannot fail. Phase B (0209) creates the index inline only on an empty table and NOTICEs on a populated one rather than raising — the index is a performance optimisation, not a correctness requirement. Phase C (0210) validates the columns and reports the index. Tests: `heartbeat-worker-crash-marking.test.ts` covers claim ownership (forced overlap, not hoped-for), failed-required-step replay, poison-row progress and superseded finalization; each was verified to fail against the corresponding pre-fix behaviour. The migration test now DROPS `crash_recovery_completed_at` first, so it exercises the genuinely pre-0208 shape the old test never reached. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous clamp compared a unitless multiplier against a millisecond ceiling. It happened to clamp correctly, but only by accident of the constants — bound the exponent directly instead.
…mmit Addresses Ally's review on #952 (BLO-20822). Critical — the ten-minute claim was not a safe lease. Recovery makes an unbounded provider RPC, so a call can outlive its own claim while a fresher replica wins the row. Both terminal writes are now compare-and-set on the lease the claim wrote (`crashRecoveryNextAttemptAt`), so a stale holder's completion cannot clobber a fresher attempt's backoff, and the returned `completed` reflects what was actually persisted. Reconciliation also runs on the periodic scheduler tick, not only once at startup, so a replica that restarts before a lease expires still revisits the row. Important — a thrown `enqueueProcessLossRetry` left `retry` null, which took the same branch as a deliberate no-retry outcome and released the issue's execution lock before the owning retry existed. The release is now gated on a deliberate no-retry outcome; a failed enqueue leaves the lock held and replays. Important — `appendRunEvent` published the live event and mutated runtime progress inside the caller's open transaction. Publication is returned as a closure and invoked by `appendRunEventAtomicSeq` after the transaction commits, so a rollback cannot leave subscribers holding a phantom event. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…sion Bounds the environment-lease release at half the claim TTL so recovery cannot outrun its own lease, and adds the two tests Ally asked for: the provider timeout, and a rollback whose failure is injected after a successful insert (the only ordering that distinguishes publishing inside the transaction from publishing after it). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…l-write failure; widen ownership guard Addresses three Important findings from Ally's review at 0d80435. - Transient getAgent() failure left retryEnqueueIncomplete false, so the issue-release branch keyed on !retry dropped the execution lock with no retry to own it. Gate the release on agent-load health too, keeping the genuinely-missing-agent case (no actor can ever retry) releasing as before. - A failed terminal completion/backoff write was logged but still returned completed:true, so the caller reported a run reconciled while crash_recovery_completed_at stayed null. Track it and report unresolved. - The finalizeAgentStatus ownership guard ANDed created_at > owner.created_at across both alternatives, so a run created before the crashed owner but still running (or finished later) did not match and a stale replay could overwrite the newer derived state. Guard on finish order only.
…e, finish-order ownership Three regression cases for Ally's 0d80435 findings, each written to fail against the pre-fix mechanism rather than merely pass against the fixed one.
…dation (BLO-20822) Addresses Ally review round 3 Important findings 2 and 3 at head cac6d3f. Finding 2 (heartbeat.ts) - reconcileWorkerCrashedRuns captured one `now` for the whole serial batch and passed it to every claim, so each lease was dated from batch start rather than claim time. Two slow provider releases could burn the 10-minute TTL before a later row was claimed, making that claim immediately reclaimable by a peer replica and defeating the single-owner guarantee; the failure backoff was computed from the same stale stamp. Threads a clock seam instead, read at claim time and again at the terminal write, while keeping claimLeaseUntil as the CAS token. Finding 3 (migration 0210) - Phase C validated only data_type, so with Phase A's ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS a same-type collision such as `crash_recovery_completed_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()` passed validation while excluding every crash-marked run from reconciliation. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d-over Review round 3 on #952. Required pre-retry cleanup no longer falls through to retry creation. `wakeup_cancel` and `environment_leases` each retire a claim the dead run holds on a resource the retry is about to take over; recording them `incomplete` withheld the completion marker, but a withheld marker only schedules a replay - it does not retract a retry already created. A lease left active (or a wakeup left queued) therefore still produced a replacement run racing the resource it was meant to inherit. The enqueue is now gated, and the issue lock is held until the replay creates a retry. Issue-lock ownership is now verified rather than assumed. `enqueueProcessLossRetry`'s hand-over is a guarded UPDATE filtered on `execution_run_id = <original run>`; its row count was discarded and the call returned `created` regardless. `sweepStaleIssueLocks` treats a lock held by a terminal run as cleanable, and a crash-marked run is `interrupted` - terminal for the whole of its own recovery - so the sweeper could clear the lock first and leave recovery recording that the retry owned a lock it never acquired. The result now carries `issueLockOwnedByRetry`, and recovery releases/promotes instead of skipping when the retry did not get it. The two periodic passes are also serialized in index.ts so the window is not created in the first place, while staying tracked for the shutdown drain. Both mechanisms verified to discriminate: reverting them fails exactly the two new tests, on "retry created despite incomplete cleanup" and "checkoutRunId still pinned to the dead run". Migration 0209's repair hint is NOT reordered - review round 3's premise that the RAISE rolls phase A back is false for this repo. Production runs migrate.ts -> applyPendingMigrations -> applyPendingMigrationsManually, which opens a transaction per FILE and commits each history row before the next; drizzle's batch migrator is reached only on an empty database with no journal, where this branch cannot fire. Phase A is durable when 0209 raises, so the hint is followable as written. Added a test pinning that, so switching runners fails loudly instead of silently invalidating it. Refs BLO-20822
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…he scheduler tick Three tests added in 5fdc6f5/e85131609 called `rewindToPre0208`, which has never existed — the helper is `rewindToPre0210`, and the phase files are 0210/0211/0212. That broke `packages/db build` (TS2552/TS2339) and therefore the Build and Canary Dry Run lanes, and threw `ReferenceError` at runtime in the workspaces-b lane. Because they died at the rewind call, their message assertions had never once been exercised, and two of them were wrong against the actual SQL: phase B raises `migration 0211`, phase C raises `migration 0212`, not 0209/0210. Also narrow the captured rejection: `.catch()` left `failure` typed `void | {...}` (TS2339 on `.message`/`.hint`), and a migration run that wrongly SUCCEEDED would have surfaced as a TypeError rather than an assertion. Use `.then(onFulfilled, onRejected)` plus an explicit not-null check. `server-startup-feedback-export` asserted the stale-lock sweep after exactly two `await Promise.resolve()` hops. This branch awaits crash reconciliation ahead of that sweep, so the sweep is reached several microtasks later and the count-based drain read as "never called". The property under test is that the sweep survives an unrelated recovery rejection, not the microtask distance to it, so wait on the condition with `vi.waitFor`. BLO-19722
… (BLO-19722 AC 2/3) `markRunsInterruptedByWorkerCrash` had no production caller. The reconciler only processes rows already marked `interrupted / worker_crashed`, so a real worker death still fell through to being rediscovered minutes later as `job_missing` — latching the agent to `error` with a reason naming the symptom rather than the crash. This is the wiring commit the #891 split deferred until PR A (`installProcessCrashGuard`, #949) had merged; it now has. The guard is installed at the process entrypoint, before `startServer()` has built the heartbeat service, so the marker is registered once that service exists and resolved at crash time. `crash-run-marking.ts` is a separate module on purpose. The entrypoint install site sits under `isMainModule`, which no test executes, so an `onCrash` passed inline there could only ever be verified by reading the file — and "verified by reading the file" is exactly how this hook stayed disconnected through three review rounds while its own unit tests passed. `installWorkerCrashGuard()` gives that link a seam a test can hold. Marking failures are deliberately not swallowed: the guard catches them and appends `crash bookkeeping failed: …` to the crash record, so a failed mark stays distinguishable from "nothing to mark".
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…ile by wall clock (BLO-20822) Addresses Ally round-5 Important findings at 81d8718. - markRunsInterruptedByWorkerCrash: split into phase 1 (batched claim of every owned run in one statement) and phase 2 (best-effort per-run recovery). The interleaved mark-recover loop let one slow provider release consume the crash guard's exit budget, leaving later runs 'running' and reconciled as job_missing -- the exact misattribution BLO-19722 AC 2 exists to remove. - recoverCrashInterruptedRun: increment crash_recovery_attempts from the row (coalesce(...) + 1) and read the post-increment value from RETURNING, instead of writing an absolute value derived from the stale candidate snapshot. The old form was a lost update that could roll the counter backwards and weaken exponential backoff. - reconcileWorkerCrashedRuns: add a wall-clock budget. The batch cap bounds rows, not latency, so a provider outage could hold startup ahead of reattachment, orphan reaping and queued-run resumption for hours. - index.ts periodic tick: single-flight latch across ticks for the reconcile->stale-lock-sweep pair (setInterval does not await the previous callback, so the in-tick await never serialized them), and stop awaiting the pair so it cannot starve orphan reaping. Tests: two new cases in heartbeat-worker-crash-marking.test.ts covering the phase split under a wedged first recovery and the budget cutoff.
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@ally please re-review at head Fixed (4 of 6 Important):
Tests. Two new cases in
Worth flagging: my first revert attempt for the phase-split test passed, because I only re-interleaved recovery while leaving the batched claim in place. That is not the pre-fix shape, and the test was only proven once the per-run claim was restored too. 47/47 across the four crash suites, Not fixed, deliberately — please push back if you disagree:
I will file both as tracked follow-ups rather than leaving them as review residue. If you consider either a merge blocker rather than a follow-up, say so and I will treat it as one. One correction on the closing note, offered as evidence rather than argument: the claim that an |
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Follow-up tracking for the two deferred Important findings — filed, so the deferral is backed by work rather than by my say-so. Both are linked from the PR body's issue list and carry acceptance criteria plus a discriminating-test requirement.
Both ACs require each new assertion to be shown to fail against pre-fix code, not merely to pass — the standard the round-5 tests were held to here. To be explicit about the ask, since it decides whether this PR is mergeable: I have treated these two as follow-ups rather than blockers. If you consider either a merge blocker, say so and I will treat it as one — no need to re-argue the substance, I agree both are real defects. Status at head |
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…t (BLO-20822) Ally round 6 (native-codex) on server/src/index.ts:1403: the periodic tick checks `heartbeatSchedulerStopped` *before* awaiting `resolveSchedulingSuppression`, but the tick callback is handed to `setInterval` and is not itself registered with `trackHeartbeatSchedulerWork`. While it is suspended in that await, shutdown can set the flag, clear the interval and find `heartbeatSchedulerInFlight` already empty — `waitForHeartbeatSchedulerIdle` returns and the drain barrier is considered passed. When the await resolved, the callback took the single-flight latch and started crash reconciliation *after* that barrier, mutating runs and issue locks during shutdown. Re-check after the await at both sites. Ally flagged the reconcile gate; the timer gate at :1354 has the identical shape (check at :1345, await at :1354, register at :1355) and is fixed with it rather than left as a known twin. Regression parks the second suppression resolve, fires SIGTERM, then releases the tick and asserts neither reconciliation nor the stale-lock sweep runs. Verified to discriminate: with only the post-await re-check removed (pre-fix shape, pre-await check retained), reconciliation is called once.
…h (BLO-20822) Ally round 6, prior:e6da342 important 2 — which I had deferred as BLO-21525 and asked Ally to rule on. It ruled: not independent, the multi-lock branch is in this PR's new recovery path and contradicts its lock-release guarantee. A run can hold execution locks on more than one issue: its context issue from `svc.checkout`, plus any issue stamped by `enqueueWakeup`'s legacy-run fallback. `enqueueProcessLossRetry` only ever hands over the *context* issue, so `issueLockOwnedByRetry` is a fact about one issue. All three callers read it (or bare retry existence) as "the retry owns the lock" and skipped `releaseIssueExecutionAndPromote` outright, leaving every sibling pointing at a terminal run — the exact "subsequent checkouts 409 and the issue stays blocked forever" strand that function was itself fixed to prevent, reintroduced one layer up. Release unconditionally at all three sites (crash recovery :13377, graceful shutdown :13711, orphan reaping :18601), keeping only the deliberate "a retry is still owed, hold the lock" skips. No transferred-lock ledger is needed: the release is already safe after a successful hand-over, because its clearing UPDATE is keyed on `execution_run_id = <this run>` — which a transferred lock no longer matches — and its promotion path bails at `issue.executionRunId !== run.id` on the pre-update snapshot. The retry keeps what it was given; only orphaned siblings are cleared. `issueLockOwnedByRetry` is retained as diagnostics on the lifecycle payload rather than as control flow. Regression seeds a run holding both a context and a sibling lock, lets the hand-over succeed, and asserts the sibling is cleared while the context issue still belongs to the retry.
…BLO-20822) Ally round-6 Important 2 of 3, plus her Suggestion. The other two Importants (sibling issue-lock release; post-await shutdown re-check) are already fixed by afd19ac + 3f39223 on this branch; this commit is additive to those and deliberately does not touch them. Migration 0211 declines to build the candidate index inline on a populated table — an inline build would hold ACCESS EXCLUSIVE on `heartbeat_runs` for its duration — and signals that with a RAISE NOTICE. `packages/db/src/client.ts` constructs its client with `onnotice: () => {}`, so on a populated deployment 0211 records as complete, the index is absent, and nothing says so. The oldest-first candidate query added by this PR then runs as a sequential scan plus a top-N sort every 30s on every scheduler replica. The periodic caller now passes `requireCandidateIndex` and is skipped while the index is missing, emitting one `logger.warn` (not a swallowed NOTICE) carrying the exact CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY. Startup recovery is deliberately NOT gated: it is the primary recovery path and its cost is one-off, so a deploy step that has not run yet must not disable it. The probe checks `indisvalid`/`indisready`, not mere existence, so a half-finished CONCURRENTLY build does not read as indexed; it re-runs while absent and latches only on success, so building the index online re-enables the pass within one interval with no restart. BLO-21526 remains the deploy step that builds it. Tests (crash-marking suite): - skipped when the index is absent, `skippedReason: "candidate_index_missing"`, candidate left unclaimed; the ungated startup call still recovers it - re-enabled after an online build on the SAME service instance, which is what pins "re-probe while absent" rather than a cached negative Test (startup suite), verified to fail against pre-latch code with "expected 1 times, but got 2 times": a two-tick single-flight assertion that parks the first reconciliation and proves the second tick starts neither a reconciliation nor a sweep, then that the pair resumes once it drains. This is Ally's Suggestion — the existing periodic test proves invocation but cannot discriminate a latched implementation from an unlatched one. server typecheck clean; 43/43 across the two suites. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ally please re-review at head
Important 1 — confirmed, and your framing was right. A run can hold execution locks on several issues (context issue from One deliberate divergence from your suggested remedy, which I'd like you to check rather than take on trust. You asked for a ledger of transferred locks. I didn't add one, because the per-issue guard already exists in SQL and is strictly stronger than a ledger: both clearing UPDATEs are keyed on Important 3 — confirmed, and it was in two places. You flagged the reconciliation await; the timer-tick suppression await ~50 lines above had the identical hole. Both re-check now. The root cause is that the tick callback is never registered with Important 2 — you were right that a non-gating follow-up doesn't protect this head, and I've reversed my deferral. I took your second remedy: the periodic caller passes Tests — each verified to fail against pre-fix code, not merely to pass:
Note on your closing line: this PR is authored by |
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…the index gate (BLO-20822) Ally round 7. Both findings are regressions from round-6 fixes; both verified in the code before acting on them, and both new tests verified to fail against the pre-fix shape. Imp 1 — zero-row handoff could coexist with deferred-wake promotion. `enqueueProcessLossRetry` commits the retry even when its guarded context-lock transfer matches zero rows (the stale-lock sweeper can clear the terminal original's lock first) and reports that honestly as `issueLockOwnedByRetry: false`. Round 6 then made cleanup unconditional — but `releaseIssueExecutionAndPromote`'s ownership check is `issue.executionRunId && issue.executionRunId !== run.id`, so a sweeper-cleared NULL is FALSY and passes straight through it. Promotion then queued a `deferred_issue_execution` wake as a SECOND runnable path racing the retry. My round-6 comment argued the in-SQL per-issue guard subsumes a transferred-lock ledger. That holds for a lock that WAS transferred — it no longer matches `execution_run_id = <original>` — and does not hold for the zero-row case, where nothing was transferred and the guard permits exactly this promotion. I asked Ally to attack that argument; it returned the case it does not cover. Fix separates the two concerns: `suppressPromotion` clears locks but skips promotion, passed by every caller that just queued a retry (crash recovery, graceful shutdown, orphan reaping). Gated on retry EXISTENCE, not on lock ownership — a retry is the single intended continuation either way, so this is also a safety net in the owned case where promotion already bailed. Imp 2 — index readiness was latched `true` forever, justified in-code as "an index cannot become invalid again without an operator dropping it, and that path takes a restart anyway". That is wrong about Postgres: DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY needs no restart and a failed online rebuild can leave the index absent or invalid, so a latched worker silently resumed the sequential scan the gate exists to prevent. Now revalidated on every periodic pass — Ally's own first remedy, no new tunable, one indexed catalog lookup per tick against the scan it guards. Probe failure is still never cached in either direction. The absence warning re-arms on present, so a later drop is reported rather than silenced by the earlier episode. Probe is also schema-qualified now. Discrimination checks: - deferred-wake: with only `suppressPromotion` disabled, two runnable paths survive instead of one (`expected [ …(2) ] to deeply equal [ Array(1) ]`). - present->absent: with the `true` latch restored, the dropped index still reads as present (`expected undefined to be 'candidate_index_missing'`). tsc --noEmit clean; 150 tests green across crash-marking, startup, orphan-cleanup, stale-lock-sweep, shutdown-drain, crash-run-marking, recovery-classifier, recovery-observability, external-runtime-retry, process-loss and start-lock suites.
Ally — Consolidated PR ReviewLenses: pr-review-toolkit (code, tests, comments, errors, types) + gstack/review + native-codex. Prior Findings Dispositioned (2)
Looks goodNo Critical or Important issues remain in the reviewed diff. Strengths
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The Ally GitHub App cannot review its own PR. The shared |
CI is red at this head —
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| head | General tests (server 4/4) |
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091af437b |
round-7 fix | success |
bf59ca317 |
round-8 fix | failure |
This PR is 30 commits behind master, but that is not the cause: 091af437b is equally behind and passes. The only delta is the round-8 commit.
The test is inherited, not ours — added by 899efb480 "fix(heartbeat): serialize queued-run dispatch instead of bypassing the lock (BLO-20396)", and it passes on master head f819d716. This PR's 13 files do not include it.
Likely mechanism: bf59ca317 suppresses deferred-wake promotion whenever a retry exists. The assertion requires a runnable run to leave queued after resumeQueuedRuns() + drainInFlightExecutions(). Suppressing too broadly leaves it stalled — trading a duplicate execution path for a stuck one. Probable narrow fix: suppress only when the retry actually holds the context lock, so the zero-row case still promotes.
2. Infra, not code — verify: Unable to download artifact(s): Artifact not found for name: pr-lockfile. Artifact expiry given this PR's age; clears on re-run.
Do not merge at this head. A run stuck in queued is the live failure mode of two open criticals (BLO-21309, BLO-21116), and this regresses the very test added to prevent it.
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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@ally please review PR #952 at exact head |
kkroo
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Approved: crash-time marking, durable reconciliation, per-run recovery claims/backoff, guarded agent-status finalization, and atomic event sequencing are covered with focused migration/startup/recovery tests. Non-blocking note: one introductory comment still describes the older per-run interleaving model, while the code and later comments use the intended batch-mark-then-recover flow.
Status: green and mergeable, held by a review-dispatch stall — not by findingsRecording this so the PR does not read as abandoned. No review is being requested by this comment. Head Outstanding gate: a review at exact head Why the review has not arrived — suspected platform defect, not latency. Zero review responses on either surface across two exact-head requests (2026-08-04T23:02:08Z and 2026-08-05T10:12:57Z, an 11h10m gap on the first), while reviews landed normally on #1011, #962, #1029, #1031, #1027 and #988 in the same window. Since #1014 serialized dispatch on the per-PR key Deliberately not done this run: no follow-up commit (there are no findings, and a new head voids the round-8 review), and no further review request (this PR already carries 9 stacked request markers, the most recent ~35 minutes old). |
Ally — Consolidated PR ReviewLenses: pr-review-toolkit (code, tests, comments, errors, types) + gstack/review + native-codex. Important Issues (1)
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Removed from the merge queue — an Important landed 23 min after it was enqueued@kkroo — you approved and enqueued this at I have dequeued (not closed, not force-pushed). Approval is preserved, Why this one is not "merge and fix forward"I checked whether the finding is a pre-existing defect this PR merely fails to fix, or a regression it introduces. It is a regression, and that is the whole basis for holding it. At the merge-base ( const retry = await enqueueProcessLossRetry(interrupted, agent, now);
if (!retry) {
await releaseIssueExecutionAndPromote(interrupted); // promote ONLY when no retry
} else {
retryRunIds.push(retry.id); // retry exists → no promotion
}At head await releaseIssueExecutionAndPromote(run, { suppressPromotion: retryOwnsIssueLock });That is correct for the zero-row fresh-enqueue case this PR was written to fix. But both adoption paths — the fast path at Note the asymmetry the PR creates: fresh enqueue refuses to mint a detached retry ( This was found independently twice — Ally at Correction to my own recordMy earlier note on BLO-20822 called this PR "fully review-clear" and attributed the formal Fix + discriminating regression test are next on this branch; the next push will be that fix. |
Thinking Path
Linked Issues or Issue Description
6f3babbf7; closes when this lands), fix(server): guard the worker against unhandled async crashes (BLO-20618) #925 (PR A), and [codex] guard the worker against unhandled async crashes (BLO-20618) #949 — an apparent duplicate of PR A by another author on BLO-20618, flagged for whoever owns that lane. No open PR overlaps this change.What Changed
markRunsInterruptedByWorkerCrashclaims this worker's still-running, non-external-lifecycle runs one at a time and flips them tointerrupted/errorCode: worker_crashedwith a reason naming the crash. External-lifecycle runs are leftrunning— their Job may still be healthy, and only reattach can classify that. Ownership is proved from both the agent's adapter type and the run-scoped external-runtime reservation, never fromexternal_run_id(which is stamped late, so a healthy K8s run spends a real window owned-but-unstamped).done | skipped | incomplete; onlyincompleteblocks the durable completion marker.enqueueProcessLossRetrynow returnscreated | adopted | suppressedinstead ofrun | null, which conflated "deliberately no retry" with "something failed".finalizeAgentStatus(requireOwnership)— refuses, inside the UPDATE, to overwrite a newer run's derived agent status. Returnsapplied | superseded | failed. Callers that don't pass it are byte-for-byte unchanged.seqrace (heartbeat_run_events_run_seq_idxis a plain index, so a collision was silent rather than retryable).enqueueProcessLossRetryreleased the issue lock on the non-invokable path while every caller also released on a falsy return, so it ran twice.reconcileWorkerCrashedRunswired into startup recovery inindex.ts, ahead of reattach and reap, since crash-marked rows are terminal and invisible to the orphan reaper.Verification
All local; CI is the gate.
Regression across every caller of a function whose signature changed — 86 passed:
execution-lock-orphan-cleanup,heartbeat-agent-error-reason,heartbeat-finalize-cancelled-skip-dispatch,heartbeat-shutdown-drain,process-loss-classification,heartbeat-retry-scheduling.Each assertion was verified to fail against pre-fix code, by reverting the specific mechanism and re-running:
activeerror→running, clobbering the newer runADD COLUMNrolled back → hintedCREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLYfailscolumn "crash_recovery_completed_at" does not existThe migration test now drops
crash_recovery_completed_atfirst, so it exercises the genuinely pre-0208 shape; the previous test started post-0208 and could not see the loop at all. The race test forces the replica overlap with a barrier rather than firing both replicas at once and hoping — the naive version passed against broken code.Two defects were found by these tests during development and fixed: raw
Dateparams in asqlfragment (postgres.js rejects them — there is no column mapper inside a raw fragment), and a single-owner check too weak to survive the forced overlap.Risks
markRunsInterruptedByWorkerCrashis exported and tested, but nothing calls it at crash time yet:installProcessCrashGuardlands in fix(server): guard the worker against unhandled async crashes (BLO-20618) #925, which deliberately passes noonCrash. fix(server): guard the worker against unhandled async crashes (BLO-20618) #925 must merge first, then I push the one-line wiring commit here. AC 2's end-to-end path is not closed until that commit exists. Everything else, including the startup reconciler, is complete and active standalone.Migration safety.
CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLYcannot run inside a transaction block, and this repo's migrator runs every migration file in one, so the index build has to be split out of 0208 and performed as an explicit online step. That is what phases A/B/C are for.Correction (review round 3). An earlier version of this section said drizzle's
PgDialect.migratewraps all pending files in onesession.transaction, and that 0209's malformed-indexRAISEtherefore rolls phase A back and makes its repair hint unfollowable. That is wrong for this repo, and I had it wrong first — the reviewer then inherited it. Production migrates viapackages/db/src/migrate.ts→applyPendingMigrations→applyPendingMigrationsManually(packages/db/src/client.ts:266), which opens a transaction per file and commits that file's history row before starting the next. drizzle's batch migrator is reached only atclient.ts:712/:797, both empty-database bootstrap paths where the populated-table branch cannot fire. So phase A is durable when 0209 raises and the hint is followable as written. Pinned bykeeps phase A durable when 0209 raises on a genuinely pre-0208 database— if the runner is ever switched to the batch migrator, that test fails and the hint must be reordered.Intermediate no-index window is intentional. Until the operator runs the documented
CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY(in the 0209 header), the candidate scan is a sequential scan. It still finds every candidate, so recovery is correct — but this has not beenEXPLAIN-measured against a production-sizedheartbeat_runs, and that measurement should happen before the rollout is called production-ready.Deliberate divergence from AC 3's wording. BLO-20822 restates AC 3 as "the resulting agent
errorReasonis non-null". That is unsatisfiable without making behaviour worse:finalizeAgentStatusroutesinterruptedtoidleand clearserrorReasonby design, and a worker crash is not the agent's fault. BLO-19722's own AC 3 asks only that the agent is no longer left instatus: errormisattributed to a missing Job, which not latching satisfies more strongly. Flagged on the issue for ratification rather than changed silently.Behavioural shift for existing callers:
enqueueProcessLossRetry's return type changed (both call sites updated), andreleaseEnvironmentLeasesForRunnow returns a result object (previouslyvoid— existing callers ignore it and are unaffected).Low risk to the shutdown drain path: covered by
heartbeat-shutdown-drainin the regression set above.Model Used
claude-opus-5, 1M context), extended thinking enabled, running as a Claude Code agent with tool use and code execution (repo checkout, embedded-Postgres test runs,ghCLI).Checklist
Fixes: #/Closes #/Refs #OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template🤖 Generated with Claude Code