feat(15.0.0)!: FedCode is non_exhaustive + admission is unconstructible unless verified (#274); CC decimals assigned (#275)

Cargo.toml

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ members = [
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "14.2.0"
+version = "15.0.0"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.86"
 license = "AGPL-3.0-or-later"

FSD/FSD-003_FEDERATION_IDENTITY_CODES.md

@@ -192,9 +192,26 @@ ml_dsa_65_pubkey_sha256 = sha256(raw ML-DSA-65 public key)
    implementation MUST NOT treat a commitment match as authentication of the
    identity.
 
-Verify exposes `fedcode::verify_pulled_ml_dsa_65_pubkey(&code, pulled)` as the
-one blessed check. A code with **no** commitment fails closed there: there is
-nothing to bind the pulled key to.
+Verify exposes two surfaces, and the second is the one a host should use:
+
+- `fedcode::verify_pulled_ml_dsa_65_pubkey(&code, pulled)` — the check itself.
+- **`fedcode::AdmittedHybridKey::admit(&code, pulled)`** — the same check in an
+  enforcing shape. Its fields are private and this is its only constructor, so
+  a value exists **only** if the pull matched. A host that takes an
+  `AdmittedHybridKey` as its registration input cannot express the unchecked
+  path; with the free function alone, nothing structurally stops a host from
+  registering a pulled body it never checked, and that failure is silent
+  (CIRISVerify#274).
+
+A code with **no** commitment fails closed in both: there is nothing to bind
+the pulled key to, so a v1/v2 code is not a hybrid registration path at all.
+
+**What the commitment proves, precisely.** It proves the ML-DSA half is the one
+the code's minter committed to — **not** that whoever holds the Ed25519 key
+also holds this ML-DSA key. Nobody cross-signs the two halves at registration,
+and they need not: persist admits `algorithm: "hybrid"` only and every row must
+verify under **both** signatures, so a holder of one half can never produce an
+admitting row. Joint control is proven at **first use**, not at registration.
 
 ### 3A.4 Compatibility
 

README.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 **Decide whether evidence about a machine, a build, or a key is worth
 believing — and say exactly how much.**
 
-v14.2.0 · Rust + Python · AGPL-3.0 · Post-quantum from day one
+v15.0.0 · Rust + Python · AGPL-3.0 · Post-quantum from day one
 
 CIRISVerify is an embeddable Rust library (with C FFI and a Python wheel) for
 **hardware attestation verification, trust-anchor management, and artifact

bindings/python/ciris_verify/__init__.py

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ def get_library_version() -> str:
     return __version__
 
 
-__version__ = "14.2.0"
+__version__ = "15.0.0"
 __all__ = [
     "CIRISVerify",
     "MockCIRISVerify",

bindings/python/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "ciris-verify"
-version = "14.2.0"
+version = "15.0.0"
 description = "Python bindings for CIRISVerify hardware-rooted license verification"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "AGPL-3.0-or-later"

evidence/cc_impl.tsv

@@ -65,11 +65,11 @@ decimal_id	claim_id	repo	path#symbol	crate@version
 3.4.5	CLM-binding-disposition-split	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/classification.rs#Gating	ciris-verify-core@v13.0.0
 2.6.1.1	CLM-redactable-commitment	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/redactable.rs#RedactableCommitment	ciris-verify-core@v13.0.0
 5.1	CLM-presentation-identifier-scope	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/presentation.rs#IdentifierScope	ciris-verify-core@v13.0.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-subject-binding	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/subject_binding.rs#SubjectBinding	ciris-verify-core@v13.1.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-subject-binding-keyrecord	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/federation_self_record.rs#check_subject_binding	ciris-verify-core@v13.1.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-scope-destination	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-crypto/src/scope_privacy.rs#derive_destination	ciris-crypto@v13.4.0
+2.3.2.1	CLM-subject-binding	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/subject_binding.rs#SubjectBinding	ciris-verify-core@v13.1.0
+3.3.6	CLM-subject-binding-keyrecord	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/federation_self_record.rs#check_subject_binding	ciris-verify-core@v13.1.0
+5.4.6	CLM-scope-destination	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-crypto/src/scope_privacy.rs#derive_destination	ciris-crypto@v13.4.0
 5.4.6	CLM-announce-suppress	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/announce_policy.rs#may_announce	ciris-verify-core@v13.6.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-key-validity-window	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/federation_self_record.rs#valid_until_in_envelope	ciris-verify-core@v14.0.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-fedcode-owned-nodes	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/fedcode.rs#OwnedNode	ciris-verify-core@v14.1.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-keyring-rng-latch	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-keyring/src/lib.rs#mint_p256_signing_key	ciris-keyring@v14.1.0
-UNASSIGNED	CLM-fedcode-pqc-commitment	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/fedcode.rs#verify_pulled_ml_dsa_65_pubkey	ciris-verify-core@v14.2.0
+2.1	CLM-key-validity-window	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/federation_self_record.rs#valid_until_in_envelope	ciris-verify-core@v14.0.0
+2.6.8	CLM-fedcode-owned-nodes	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/fedcode.rs#OwnedNode	ciris-verify-core@v14.1.0
+4.2.2	CLM-keyring-rng-latch	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-keyring/src/lib.rs#mint_p256_signing_key	ciris-keyring@v14.1.0
+2.6.8	CLM-fedcode-pqc-commitment	CIRISVerify	src/ciris-verify-core/src/fedcode.rs#verify_pulled_ml_dsa_65_pubkey	ciris-verify-core@v14.2.0

scripts/bump-version.sh

@@ -61,6 +61,32 @@ else
     echo -e "${RED}✗${NC} Cargo.toml not found"
 fi
 
+# 1b. Update intra-workspace path-dependency version pins.
+#
+# A member crate pins a sibling by MAJOR (`version = "14"`) alongside its
+# `path`. Cargo enforces that pin, so a major bump leaves the workspace
+# unbuildable until it is updated — and this was missed by hand at 13.0.0,
+# 14.0.0 and 15.0.0 before being automated here. Minor/patch bumps are a
+# no-op, since the pin carries only the major.
+NEW_MAJOR="${NEW_VERSION%%.*}"
+PIN_CHANGED=0
+for member_toml in "$REPO_ROOT"/src/*/Cargo.toml; do
+    [ -f "$member_toml" ] || continue
+    # Only rewrite pins on deps that also carry a `path = "../…"` — a real
+    # sibling — never a same-named crates.io dependency.
+    if grep -qE '^ciris-[a-z-]+ = \{ path = "\.\./[^"]+", version = "[0-9]+"' "$member_toml"; then
+        sed -i.bak -E "s|^(ciris-[a-z-]+ = \{ path = \"\.\./[^\"]+\", version = \")[0-9]+(\")|\1${NEW_MAJOR}\2|" "$member_toml" \
+            && rm -f "$member_toml.bak"
+        if ! git -C "$REPO_ROOT" diff --quiet -- "$member_toml" 2>/dev/null; then
+            PIN_CHANGED=1
+            echo -e "${GREEN}✓${NC} $(basename "$(dirname "$member_toml")")/Cargo.toml: sibling pin -> \"$NEW_MAJOR\""
+        fi
+    fi
+done
+if [ "$PIN_CHANGED" = "1" ]; then
+    CHANGES+=("intra-workspace sibling pins -> \"$NEW_MAJOR\"")
+fi
+
 # 2. Update Python pyproject.toml
 PYPROJECT="$REPO_ROOT/bindings/python/pyproject.toml"
 if [ -f "$PYPROJECT" ]; then

src/ciris-keyring/Cargo.toml

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ keyring = { version = "3", optional = true }
 # The base dependency is the `random` feature only, which is `[]` plus the
 # `rand_core` this crate already pulls — so the light default stays light. The
 # heavier PQC surface is still feature-gated below.
-ciris-crypto = { path = "../ciris-crypto", version = "14", default-features = false, features = ["random"] }
+ciris-crypto = { path = "../ciris-crypto", version = "15", default-features = false, features = ["random"] }
 
 # Platform-specific
 [target.'cfg(target_os = "android")'.dependencies]

src/ciris-verify-core/src/bin/ciris_verify.rs

@@ -2537,16 +2537,18 @@ fn run_fedcode_new(a: FedcodeNew) {
     };
 
     let key_id = fedcode::derive_key_id(&a.label, &ed_pub);
-    let fc = FedCode {
-        owned_nodes: Vec::new(),
-        ml_dsa_65_pubkey_sha256: None,
+    let mut fc = FedCode::new(
         kind,
-        key_id: key_id.clone(),
-        pubkey_ed25519_base64: base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&ed_pub),
-        transport_hint: a.transport_hint.clone(),
-        alias_hint: Some(a.label.clone()),
-        group_key_id: a.group_key_id.clone(),
-    };
+        key_id.clone(),
+        base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&ed_pub),
+    )
+    .with_alias_hint(a.label.clone());
+    if let Some(h) = a.transport_hint.clone() {
+        fc = fc.with_transport_hint(h);
+    }
+    if let Some(g) = a.group_key_id.clone() {
+        fc = fc.with_group_key_id(g);
+    }
     let code = match fedcode::encode(&fc) {
         Ok(c) => c,
         Err(e) => {