refigure is pre-1.0 and moves fast (see the versioning note in pyproject.toml/the project's own README). Only the most recently published version on PyPI is supported — there is no backport policy for older releases.
Please report security issues privately — not through a public GitHub issue.
- Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting ("Report a vulnerability" under this repo's Security tab).
- Alternative: email helg.demidov88@gmail.com.
Include, if you can: the affected version, a minimal reproduction (an input file or config that triggers the issue), and the potential impact.
This is a single-maintainer, pre-1.0 open-source project — there's no formal SLA, but reports are read and triaged personally, generally within a few days.
refigure parses untrusted DOCX/XLSX files (OOXML zip archives) and,
when the optional [vlm]/[vlm-direct] extras are enabled, sends
rendered figure crops to a configured VLM provider. The classes of issue
most relevant to that surface: zip-bomb/decompression-ratio abuse, XML
entity expansion, path traversal via archive member names, and
injection through CLI/MCP file-path or config handling.
The CI pipeline (.github/workflows/ci.yml) runs ruff's S (security)
ruleset, Trivy secret scanning, pip-audit, and CodeQL on every change —
that configuration, not this file, is the current source of truth for
what's actively checked.