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docs(plan): record OOPIF probe PASS verdict under M0 findings #12

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gcharang merged 1 commit into from
Jul 17, 2026
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docs(plan): record OOPIF probe PASS verdict under M0 findings #12

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36 changes: 28 additions & 8 deletions docs/technical-plan.md
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Expand Up @@ -251,7 +251,10 @@ The hard problem. Approach (matches Playwright / chrome-devtools-mcp):
> **Milestone 0 confirmed this surface on 2026-07-13 — see "M0 findings".** `Target.getTargets` is
> restricted under `chrome.debugger` (`"Not allowed"`); tab enumeration/switching is backed by the
> WebExtensions `chrome.tabs.*` API (not CDP), and per-tab attach uses `chrome.debugger.attach({ tabId })`.
> This was the one real technical risk of the CDP approach; it is now retired.
> This was the one real technical risk of the CDP approach; it is now retired. The one sub-question it
> deferred — cross-origin-iframe (OOPIF) auto-attach via `Target.setAutoAttach{ flatten: true }` — probed
> **green on 2026-07-17 (Chrome 150)**: the iframe attached and was driven through its own `sessionId`
> (see "M0 findings").

## M0 findings — CDP surface + a11y ref-model confirmed (2026-07-13)

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -286,16 +289,33 @@ feeds its LLM. D7 confirmed end-to-end.
only their extension-side *implementation* is pinned here.
- v1 scope is a single designated tab/session anyway (see "Out of scope").

**One sub-question deferred at M0, probe SHIPPED at M5 (2026-07-17):** cross-origin /
**One sub-question deferred at M0, probe RUN GREEN at M5 (2026-07-17):** cross-origin /
out-of-process iframe (OOPIF) traversal via `Target.setAutoAttach{ flatten: true }` (a *different*
`Target` method than the blocked `getTargets`, generally permitted under `chrome.debugger`).
`apps/cdp-spike` now carries a focused **OOPIF probe** (side-panel button + bundled
`Target` method than the blocked `getTargets`, and — now confirmed — permitted under `chrome.debugger`).
`apps/cdp-spike` carries a focused **OOPIF probe** (side-panel button + bundled
`oopif-test.html` cross-origin-iframe page + runbook in its README): it runs `setAutoAttach`,
collects `Target.attachedToTarget` events, and drives each attached target through session-scoped
`sendCommand({tabId, sessionId}, …)` (`Runtime.evaluate` + `Accessibility.getFullAXTree`). The
probe is attended (~5 min, real Chromium ≥125) and has not been run yet; record its verdict here
when it runs. Driver implementation in `apps/extension` stays gated on a green probe AND a
consumer actually needing cross-origin-iframe targeting — the single-frame path is proven.
`sendCommand({tabId, sessionId}, …)` (`Runtime.evaluate` + `Accessibility.getFullAXTree`).

**Verdict: PASS — auto-attach works, session routing works; the deferred unknown is retired.** Run
2026-07-17, attended, on **Chrome 150.0.7871.114 (64-bit)** (≥125), against the bundled `oopif-test.html`
(a `file://` top frame embedding a cross-site `https://example.org` iframe). Probe summary verbatim:
*"OOPIF auto-attach WORKS: 1 iframe target(s) attached and driven via session-scoped commands."* Evidence
it drove the **iframe**, not the top frame:
- `Target.setAutoAttach { flatten: true }` — **OK** (the target-discovery capability `getTargets` is blocked for is permitted here);
- `Target.attachedToTarget` announced `iframe https://example.org/`;
- `Runtime.evaluate` via the iframe's `sessionId` returned `https://example.org/` — **not** the
`file://…/oopif-test.html` top-frame URL;
- `Accessibility.getFullAXTree` via that `sessionId` returned the iframe's **isolated** 15-node tree
(`heading:Example Domain, link:Learn more`), **without** the top frame's `top-frame button` — which the
top frame's own 34-node tree did contain. Same tab, two `sessionId`s, two isolated frames driven
independently: exactly the session routing the real driver needs.

The same run re-confirmed the M0 baseline unchanged — 10/11 CDP commands OK, `Target.getTargets` still
`{ code: -32000, message: "Not allowed" }` — so the restriction that motivated the deferral persists and
`setAutoAttach` sidesteps it. **Cross-frame driver work in `apps/extension` is now unblocked, but stays
gated on a consumer actually needing cross-origin-iframe targeting** — the single-frame path remains the
proven default; nothing is built on OOPIF until a consumer requires it.

## Consumer integration — the governed connector (breakwater + flowsafe)

Expand Down