Skip to content

chore(deps): update dependency undici to v6.28.0 [security] - #1161

Open
renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
renovate/npm-undici-vulnerability
Open

chore(deps): update dependency undici to v6.28.0 [security]#1161
renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
renovate/npm-undici-vulnerability

Conversation

@renovate

@renovate renovate Bot commented Aug 5, 2026

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
undici (source) 6.27.06.28.0 age confidence

undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body 'type' property

CVE-2026-15157 / GHSA-m8rv-5g2x-5cg5

More information

Details

Impact

When an application passes a duck-typed blob-like body to undici's HTTP/1.1 dispatcher (via request(), stream(), pipeline(), or dispatch()) with a .type derived from untrusted input, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to append arbitrary HTTP headers and potentially smuggle a second request past the upstream.

The vulnerable branch in lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js pushes body.type directly into the outgoing headers with no validation, while every other header path in undici goes through isValidHeaderValue():

} else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
  headers.push('content-type', body.type)  // bypasses isValidHeaderValue()
}

The bug requires a hand-rolled duck-typed blob object or a Blob subclass with a controlled .type. Native Blob is safe because its constructor strips CRLF from .type. fetch() is unaffected because it validates via the Headers class. Ecosystem consumers that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input include form-data-encoder, formdata-polyfill, and formdata-node.

Same defect class as CVE-2022-35948 (explicit content-type sink, fixed in undici 5.8.2) and CVE-2026-1527 (upgrade option sink, fixed in 6.24.0 / 7.24.0), both closed by adding isValidHeaderValue() on their respective sinks. This branch was missed.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds
  • Set an explicit, validated content-type header on the request options (skips the vulnerable branch).
  • Use a native Blob (or fetch-blob) instead of a hand-rolled duck-typed object.
  • Reject control characters in the MIME type before assigning it to .type.
  • Use fetch() instead of the non-fetch APIs.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


undici vulnerable to downstream response desynchronization via retry interceptor

CVE-2026-16728 / GHSA-8xcm-r25x-g524

More information

Details

Impact

Undici's interceptors.retry() can deliver a response whose body length does not match the Content-Length header exposed to the application after a retry or resume of a partial response. Applications that use interceptors.retry() and forward upstream response headers and bodies downstream, for example proxy or gateway applications, may emit an invalid HTTP response with a stale Content-Length header. This can lead to downstream response desynchronization, connection hangs, or response corruption in clients or intermediaries that rely on the forwarded framing metadata.

A malicious or faulty upstream can respond to a range request with a 206 Partial Content response such as:

Content-Range: bytes 0-99/300
Content-Length: 300

and then send only 99 bytes before closing the socket. interceptors.retry() can then retry with Range: bytes=99-99, receive the final byte, and deliver a 100-byte body to the application while the response headers still contain Content-Length: 300 from the first response.

The bug requires interceptors.retry() to be enabled, an upstream that returns a partial response with a mismatched framing header, and a downstream forwarder that does not remove or recalculate Content-Length.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds
  • Disable interceptors.retry() for untrusted upstreams.
  • Remove or recalculate Content-Length before forwarding a response body assembled or transformed by Undici.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


undici vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via unsanitized domain and unparsed setCookie fields

CVE-2026-16729 / GHSA-v3r7-h72x-cjcm

More information

Details

Impact

The setCookie function has two attribute injection paths. validateCookieDomain does not reject semicolons (validateCookiePath already does at 0x3B), so a domain value like example.com; SameSite=None lands verbatim as Domain=example.com; SameSite=None. The unparsed array's loop only checks each entry contains = and does not sanitize values, so an entry like X-Custom=val; HttpOnly lands unchanged, injecting HttpOnly without the caller setting cookie.httpOnly = true.

Applications that pass user-controlled input to these fields, typically multi-tenant or reverse-proxy servers that scope session cookies to a tenant-supplied domain, can have SameSite CSRF protections bypassed, Secure or HttpOnly forced or stripped, or the intended SameSite tier overridden.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0.

Workarounds
  • Sanitize domain values against the RFC 1034 letter-digit-hyphen set before passing to setCookie.
  • Do not pass user-controlled data to the unparsed field.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

nodejs/undici (undici)

v6.28.0

Compare Source

Full Changelog: nodejs/undici@v6.27.0...v6.28.0


Configuration

📅 Schedule: (in timezone America/Los_Angeles)

  • Branch creation
    • At any time (no schedule defined)
  • Automerge
    • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@codecov

codecov Bot commented Aug 5, 2026

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the awaiting-review PR changes are ready and waiting for maintainer re-review label Aug 5, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

awaiting-review PR changes are ready and waiting for maintainer re-review

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

0 participants