fix(router): no-follow-redirect on fan-out/health/discovery clients + bump tmproto to v0.3.2

[ohalushchak-exadel]

Summary

Closes two related conformance gaps against the TMP provider-endpoint rules and picks up the tmproto artifact-scrub fixes from the just-cut submodule release.

Router-side HTTP clients no longer follow redirects. None of the three router-owned clients (fan-out in router.go, /health probe in healthcheck.go, discovery poll in discovery.go) set CheckRedirect. Spec forbids redirects on provider endpoints — a 3xx from a provider (or a provider registry, on the discovery poll) would let net/http replay the signed request body at whatever host DNS/rebind resolved. safeDialContext blocks only private destinations; a public attacker-controlled host would still resolve, so the redirect refusal is the load-bearing guarantee. This PR wires a shared noFollowRedirect helper (in safedial.go, alongside the dial-time SSRF guard) into the default clients built by NewRouter, NewHealthChecker, and NewDiscovery. Caller-overridden clients (WithHTTPClient / WithHealthCheckClient / WithDiscoveryClient) remain the caller's responsibility.

tmproto pin bumped from v0.3.0 to v0.3.2. Picks up:

• StripAccess now clears the URL field on known assets whose access declared signed_url (previously left the credential in the query string after nil-ing Access) and scrubs access — plus url when the access declared signed_url — from UnknownAsset raw JSON.
• The UnknownAsset scrub path uses json.Decoder.UseNumber so integers above 2^53 (IDs, epoch-ms timestamps) round-trip verbatim.

The router calls Artifact.StripAccess() on every incoming context-match request, so bumping the pin activates all of the above on the fan-out hop without any local code change on this PR.

Test plan

• go test ./... in tmproto, targeting, router — all green
• CI green after push
• Manual sanity: point the router at a provider that answers 3xx and confirm the router observes the 3xx (surfaced as a provider error) and does not follow it
• Manual sanity: a context-match request carrying a signed-URL asset fans out with the asset URL blanked
• Manual sanity: a context-match request carrying an unknown asset type with an access object fans out with that object stripped

[aao-secretariat]

Ladon verdict: Approve

Approve.

Clean, well-scoped security fix: no-follow-redirect (http.ErrUseLastResponse) wired into all three default router-side clients (fan-out, health, discovery), with end-to-end test coverage, correct 3xx-as-error handling, and body close on every path. The tmproto v0.3.2 pin is a real release with matching go.sum and conventional-commit markers.

Checked:

• No blocking (critical/high) findings.
• No in-diff medium findings.
• high_risk is true only because changed files match router/**; all reasons are (modified) or (added) with no reviewer medium concern, so the modifications are presumed safe (no escalation on the flag alone).
• gated_paths is false; author is not on a no-auto-approve team.

One non-blocking follow-up noted by the reviewer: the fourth trust-fetching client (registry sync, router/registry.go:75) lacks the same safeDialContext/CheckRedirect hardening, but it is latent (main.go constructs it with empty URLs). Worth a future pass but not a blocker here.

Decision table: no rows 1–8 fire → row 9 → approve.

[aao-secretariat]

Ladon verdict: Approve

Approve.

Wires a shared noFollowRedirect (returns http.ErrUseLastResponse) into the default fan-out, health, and discovery clients — closing a TMP provider-endpoint redirect-replay gap not covered by safeDialContext (private-only) — plus a consistent tmproto v0.3.0→v0.3.2 pin bump across all workspace modules with matching go.sum hashes.

Checked:

• Default-client-only scoping of the redirect suppression (no broad behavior change).
• End-to-end + wiring coverage via new router/no_follow_redirect_test.go.
• No adcp/schemas/** or adcp/types_gen.go changes — schema↔generated-type coherence intact.
• No TMP signing/verification, identity-agent TEE, or protocol-managed-skill edits.
• Consistent module resolution across all go.mod/go.sum.

high_risk is true only because files match router/**; the modifications preserve contracts and the reviewer surfaced no Critical/High/Medium findings. Three manual-sanity checkboxes are unchecked but the primary redirect path is covered by an automated test. No blocking findings, no escalation triggers, no team gate, gated_paths false — falls through to row 9.

[aao-secretariat]

Re-approval: no reviewable delta since the prior approval; re-submitting after stale-review dismissal.