Only the current MINOR line is supported. Update this table with every MINOR bump.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.24.x | ✅ |
| < 0.24.0 | ❌ |
agy-plugin-cc acts as a local CLI bridge between Anthropic's Claude Code environment and local Gemini/AGY binaries.
- Stdin transport and prompt escaping logic (
plugins/gemini/scripts/lib/gemini.mjs,plugins/gemini/scripts/transfer.mjs). - Argument validation and flag parsing (preventing flag injection into CLI subprocesses).
- Process boundary security (forcing
shell: falseon Git operations inplugins/gemini/scripts/lib/git.mjs, and resolving bare command names to an absolute executable or npm entry script so engine spawns also avoid the shell —resolveSpawnTargetinplugins/gemini/scripts/lib/process.mjs). - Secret file redaction filters (
isSecretFile()andredactSecretsFromDiff()inplugins/gemini/scripts/lib/secrets.mjs, shared by the review and transfer paths;transfer-context.mjsre-exportsisSecretFileunder its original name). - Background job state directory isolation (
GEMINI_COMPANION_DATA, then Claude Code'sCLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA, with a system-temp fallback). Workspace-local.omc/holds transfer snapshots only. - Prompt injection and delegated agency — the plugin hands repository content it did not author to an agent that may have write access. Modelled in
docs/THREAT-MODEL.md§7, mapped against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications./gemini:rescuedefaults to read-only intent and adds--writeonly when edits are requested, but AGY does not provide an enforced read-only or path boundary in either mode. The plugin reports detected writes after a turn dispatched without--write; this residual risk is known and documented, not an undisclosed flaw.
- Third-party CLI binary vulnerabilities within Google's
geminioragyexecutables. - Claude Code runtime environment process sandbox boundaries.
- User-managed OAuth token storage inside
~/.gemini/oauth_creds.jsonor AGY system keyrings.
What the plugin sends, keeps, and reads — and the single path that transmits without an explicit user command — is documented in PRIVACY.md. Report any statement there that the code does not support as a documentation defect.
If you discover a potential security vulnerability within agy-plugin-cc, please do not open a public GitHub issue.
Instead, report it responsibly via either of:
- Private Security Disclosure (preferred): Submit via GitHub Security Advisories. It keeps the report, the discussion, and the eventual advisory in one place.
- Email: arcobaleno830623@gmail.com, for anyone who cannot or would rather not use GitHub. This address is monitored by the maintainer; it is not a team inbox, so expect one person's response times.
- Initial Response: Within 48 hours.
- Status Update: Within 7 business days.
- Fix & Patch Advisory: Released in a timely patch release.