CyberLeek is an active operation that uses stolen Grand Theft Auto VI material (Rockstar Games' unreleased IP) as bait for a cryptocurrency it profits from. We keep this investigation open and evidence-backed. Every indicator is public, verifiable, and cryptographically hashed, so researchers, defenders, exchanges, and platforms can identify the operation and act on it.
Maintained by Deep Woods Security.
Full walkthrough of the CyberLeek investigation, funding to cash-out. Watch on YouTube.
A case like this is mostly noise, and that is the hard part. A hyped token pulls in thousands of traders, bots, and arbitrage wallets. A loud account insists it is "the only real one." A big number on a block explorer looks like a smoking gun. None of that, by itself, is the operator. Our problem was never finding data, there is far too much of it. It was separating the signal, what the operator actually did, from everything that only looks related.
We kept the method conservative. We started from what cannot be faked: who paid to register the site, who signed the file uploads, who created the token. We followed the funding, because the money has to come from somewhere, and that somewhere is usually a door. We claim only what a specific transaction proves, not who traded the most or who posts the loudest. And when two things share a name, we treat them as different until a transaction says otherwise.
There are two separate things carrying the CyberLeek name, and on-chain they do not connect:
- The operation (the money). The leak site
cyber-leek.com, the Arweave-hosted leak distribution, and a live token whose entire setup was funded, through one wallet, from a KuCoin account. It is quiet, has no confirmed social presence, and makes money from trading fees on locked liquidity. This is the real one, and the KuCoin account behind it is our identity lead. - The persona (the copycat). A loud Telegram and X account (
@cyberleeksreal, "The Only Real Cyberleek"), thecyberleeks.fundomain, and a pump.fun token that stalled and went nowhere. This is where the human fingerprints are (an AI-generated profile picture, a writing style, a daily posting rhythm), but no transaction ties any of it to the money.
Whether these are two people, or one operator running the persona separately from the money, the chain does not link them. So we keep them apart, and label which track each finding belongs to.
Track 1 - the operation (the money)
crypto/- the funding traced back to KuCoin, the locked-liquidity fee model, and the 270M dev-token burninfrastructure/- hosting, DNS, media delivery, and the Arweave leak distribution behindcyber-leek.com(also maps the persona's deadcyberleeks.fundomain)operator/- who is behind it: the open, publicly reported attribution lead (thestayonthegrinddDiscord handle, theCyberleekerDread post) and the method to test it against the on-chain clock. No person is named.
Track 2 - the persona (the copycat)
posting-pattern/- the Telegram and pump-wallet activity rhythm, and how well they matchwriting-style/- language and writing-style markersbrowser/- the persona's browser fingerprint, from their owncyberleeks.funscreenshotpfp-metadata/- the AI-generated profile picture and its C2PA / Grok content-credential provenance
Taken together, the operation was careful and deliberate. This was not a lucky memecoin that happened to catch a leak. Every stage shows planning:
- It built trust before it sold. Days before launch, the creator burned the dev allocation (270M tokens) and locked the liquidity on Raydium, the two standard "this is not a rug" signals, done deliberately and early.
- It took real capital to start. Locking that liquidity meant committing about 330 SOL (~$29,000 at the time) upfront that could not be pulled back out. That is a deliberate stake, not a zero-budget launch, and it came from the same KuCoin account, so real money entered through an identity-verified exchange.
- The launch was timed, and someone was ready. The leak clips did not drop at random. When they did, four wallets bought the token inside a six-minute window, none of them tracing to the deployer, which points to insider timing: somebody knew the exact moment.
- The money trail was built to resist tracing. The funding runs six hops before it reaches the token, and the chain is salted with look-alike decoy wallets that send anyone tracing it by eye onto dead ends. Whoever placed them, the effect is a trail that is harder to follow.
- Traffic was paid for, not hoped for. The site is advertised through a Google Ads account, so the audience was bought rather than earned.
- The name and the money never touch on-chain. No social account behind the CyberLeek name appears in a single transaction with the wallets that hold the money.
And yet the whole setup was paid for from a KuCoin account, a KYC exchange that has the account holder's real identity on file. Every layer above was built to slow a tracer down, but none of it changes the ending, because the money started at an exchange that knows who owns the account. The operation is sophisticated almost everywhere, except at the one point that matters for identifying who runs it.
Every dated event below is anchored to a verifiable source: an on-chain block time, a Certificate Transparency record, or a captured post. Times are UTC, 2026.
flowchart LR
subgraph FUND["Funding (the money)"]
direction LR
A13["Aug 13<br/>KuCoin funds the chain<br/>six hops to 3YLN"] --> A14["Aug 14<br/>Leak-site name<br/>registered (52yK)"] --> A15["Aug 15<br/>$CYBERLEEK minted 14:20Z<br/>liquidity locked"]
end
subgraph TRUST["Trust signal + domain"]
A22["Aug 22<br/>270M burned +<br/>cyber-leek.com<br/>registered (Cloudflare)"]
end
subgraph LAUNCH["Public launch"]
direction LR
A24["Aug 24<br/>first seen live<br/>(TLS + first archive)<br/>+ polls open"] --> A25["Aug 25<br/>Copycat: pump.fun token +<br/>cyberleeks.fun (Hostinger)<br/>+ @cyberleeksreal"]
end
A15 --> A18["Aug 18<br/>Leak clips spread;<br/>launch front-run<br/>(snipers buy 17:48-17:54Z)"] --> A22 --> A24 --> A27["Aug 27<br/>Fees claimed + cashed out<br/>2,705 SOL: ~51% KuCoin<br/>~49% CCE.Cash"]
classDef money fill:#dcfce7,stroke:#166534,color:#052e16;
classDef persona fill:#fee2e2,stroke:#991b1b,color:#450a0a;
classDef recon fill:#f3f4f6,stroke:#6b7280,color:#111827;
class A13,A14,A15,A18,A22,A24,A27 money;
class A25 persona;
| When (UTC) | Track | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 09:22 to 18:47 | money | KuCoin processing wallet (BmFd) funds the chain; six hops reach the funding wallet (3YLN) |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/ |
| 2026-08-14 09:42 | money | ArNS leak-site name wallet (52yK) first active (registers the on-chain site name) |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/arns_52yK_* |
| 2026-08-15 09:49 | money | Funding wallet pays the buffer (Ec2q) |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/buffer_Ec2q_* |
| 2026-08-15 12:23 | money | Arweave upload key (667G) first active; first Arweave leak upload follows. The leaks were first posted on the dark-web forum Dread, then mirrored to Arweave here, before any clearnet site (Dread origin per Vice Cit) |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/arweave_667G_* |
| 2026-08-15 14:20:54 | money | Token creator (Hok9) mints $CYBERLEEK (ApZux); liquidity locked on Raydium |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/creator_Hok9_* (instruction TOKEN_MINT) |
| 2026-08-18 17:48 to 17:54 | money | Leak clips spread and the $CYBERLEEK launch is front-run: four wallets buy in a ~6-minute window, none tracing to the deployer (Divyasshree N / Bitquery, confirmed on our pull) |
on-chain, operation/crosscheck/ |
| 2026-08-22 06:36:48 | money | cyber-leek.com domain registered through Cloudflare (registrar IANA 1910) |
RDAP + WHOIS, operation-recon-2026-08-29.txt |
| 2026-08-22 18:27:59 | money | 270,000,000 dev tokens burned via holding wallet (Cbfb) |
on-chain, operation/funding_spine/hold270_Cbfb_* (instruction BURN) |
| 2026-08-24 | money | cyber-leek.com first seen live: first Let's Encrypt cert and earliest archive snapshot (14:20Z). Domain registered Aug 22; exact go-live in the Aug 22 to 24 window is not independently recorded |
Certificate Transparency + archive.today |
| 2026-08-24 | money | Pay-to-vote poll option wallets (Cpj7, 3wFK) first active |
on-chain, operation/polls/ |
| 2026-08-25 06:33:48 | persona | Copycat pump.fun token (2hRg6) minted by deployer (HhFa) |
on-chain, infrastructure/ on-chain table |
| 2026-08-25 07:08 | persona | @cyberleeksreal Telegram persona's first captured post |
posting-pattern/telegram-post-times.txt |
| 2026-08-25 12:11:02 | persona | cyberleeks.fun domain registered through Hostinger (a different registrar from the operation) |
WHOIS, copycat-recon-2026-08-29.txt |
| 2026-08-27 07:27 to 07:32 | money | Creator (Hok9) claims locked-LP fees, swaps 15.49M $CYBERLEEK to SOL, then splits 2,705 SOL out roughly in half: ~51% back to KuCoin (including a leg laundered through a hub) and ~49% to the no-KYC CCE.Cash (Vice Cit Part 4, full split reproduced on our own pull) |
on-chain, operation/crosscheck/ |
The shape of it: the money was funded from a KuCoin account and the token built and
burn-signalled over roughly ten days (Aug 13 to 22, with the leak clips spreading
and the launch front-run by snipers on Aug 18). Then cyber-leek.com
was registered through Cloudflare (Aug 22) and first seen serving by Aug 24 (it
went live somewhere in that Aug 22 to 24 window; the exact moment is not
independently recorded), and the copycat spun up Aug 25 on a different registrar
(Hostinger). On Aug 27 the operator took profit: the locked-LP fees were claimed,
swapped to SOL, and split back to KuCoin and the no-KYC CCE.Cash. Every dated event here is a
hard on-chain block time, an RDAP/WHOIS record, or a Certificate Transparency
record, not an observation date.
Every artifact cited in this repo is hashed and timestamped so anyone can confirm it has not been altered since collection:
- SHA256 of each source artifact is recorded in
EVIDENCE.md. - UTC capture time is recorded next to each hash.
- archive.ph snapshots provide an independent, third-party timestamp for the live pages and posts.
- The crypto trail is reproducible from raw transactions; the on-chain evidence package verifies against its own SHA256 manifest.
Raw sensitive material (for example the leaked frames) is not published here. Its hash and archive link are enough to prove it existed and is unchanged, without redistributing it.
- No leaked media. The stolen frames are not redistributed.
- No personal-identity attribution. This documents the operation, not a named individual. We make no claim about whether the money operation and the social persona are the same actor, whether either is one person or a group, or where they are located. Those determinations are left to law enforcement. "Operator" and "persona" are neutral shorthand.
PRs welcome if verifiable from public sources. Cite every indicator with a block-explorer link, an archive.ph snapshot, or a transaction hash, and include the artifact's SHA256. No PII, no leaked media, no accusations against named people.
The funding-to-KuCoin trace in crypto/ was first published by GTAForums
user Vice Cit and reproduced here independently.
The launch front-run (sniper wallets) and the address-poisoning on the funding
trail were first published by Divyasshree N of Bitquery
(part 1,
part 2)
and verified here independently on-chain. Their "serial launcher" and Central
European timezone reads did not hold on our re-pull; see
real/crypto/ and real/operator/.
Branding and the FollowTheLeek logo by maegraphics.
Report to https://www.ic3.gov with your transaction hashes, wallet addresses, and timestamps.

