docs: verify threat models for completeness and fix silent gaps

doc/explanation/security.rst

@@ -173,6 +173,46 @@ for regeneration instructions.
    threat_model_supply_chain
    threat_model_usage
 
+.. _identified-gaps:
+
+Identified Gaps (Reserved Control IDs)
+--------------------------------------
+
+The runtime-usage threat model references four control IDs that are reserved
+for improvements not yet implemented. Reserving the IDs keeps the control
+numbering stable and makes each gap a first-class part of the risk analysis —
+you can trace every "gap C-0xx" mention in the threat models back to this
+table:
+
+.. list-table::
+   :header-rows: 1
+   :widths: 10 90
+
+   * - ID
+     - Planned control
+   * - C-018
+     - Integrity-hash enforcement for archive dependencies. The
+       ``integrity.hash`` manifest field is optional today; when it is absent no
+       content verification occurs. You can bootstrap the hash for an existing
+       manifest with ``dfetch freeze``.
+   * - C-019
+     - End-to-end content integrity for Git and SVN dependencies. Authenticity
+       currently relies on transport security (TLS / SSH) and the integrity of
+       the upstream repository; pinning to an immutable commit SHA is the
+       strongest mitigation available today.
+   * - C-020
+     - Patch-file integrity verification. ``patch:`` files referenced by the
+       manifest carry no hash, and the destination paths inside a patch are
+       validated by ``patch-ng`` rather than independently by dfetch.
+   * - C-035
+     - Upstream source-attestation verification. dfetch has no mechanism yet to
+       request or verify SLSA Source Provenance Attestations (:term:`VSA`) for
+       fetched repositories, and the manifest schema has no field to declare an
+       expected SLSA source level.
+
+When one of these controls is implemented, it moves to the
+:doc:`control_register` under its reserved ID.
+
 CRA Compliance
 --------------
 
@@ -235,7 +275,7 @@ OSCAL
 
 :term:`OSCAL` (Open Security Controls Assessment Language) is a set of
 NIST-published JSON/XML schemas for machine-readable security documentation.
-dfetch uses OSCAL 1.1.2 for two artifacts:
+dfetch uses OSCAL 1.2.2 for two artifacts:
 
 - `OSCAL Catalog model <https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/reference/latest/catalog/>`_ —
   used by ``cra_pren_4000014_oscal_catalog.json`` to represent the prEN 40000-1-4

doc/explanation/threat_model_supply_chain.rst

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Boundaries
      - Python Package Index and its staging registry.  dfetch publishes via OIDC trusted publishing - no long-lived API token stored.
 
    * - Winget Community Repository
-     - The Windows Package Manager Community Repository (https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs) where dfetch's Winget manifest is hosted.  Manifest PRs are submitted automatically by the CI release pipeline (winget-publish.yml) using the stored WINGET_TOKEN PAT (A-10).  Consumer installations resolve manifests from this repository; winget downloads the MSI installer from the URL declared in the manifest (pointing to GitHub Releases, A-01) and verifies its SHA256 hash.
+     - The Windows Package Manager Community Repository (https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs) where dfetch's Winget manifest is hosted.  Manifest PRs are submitted automatically by the CI release pipeline (winget-publish.yml) using the stored WINGET_TOKEN PAT (A-29).  Consumer installations resolve manifests from this repository; winget downloads the MSI installer from the URL declared in the manifest (pointing to GitHub Releases, A-01) and verifies its SHA256 hash.
 
 
 Data Flow Diagram
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ Data Flow Diagram
                shape = square;
                color = black;
                fontcolor = black;
-               label = "A-09: Winget\nCommunity\nRepository\n(microsoft/winget-\npkgs)";
+               label = "A-28: Winget\nCommunity\nRepository\n(microsoft/winget-\npkgs)";
                margin = 0.02;
            ]
 
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ Sequence Diagram
    entity process_APythonBuildwheelsdist_b2e5892d06 as "A-08: Python\nBuild (wheel\n/ sdist)"
    database datastore_AdfetchBuildDevDependencies_990b886585 as "A-07: dfetch\nBuild / Dev\nDependencies"
    database datastore_AbGitHubActionsBuildCache_9df04f8dae as "A-08b:\nGitHub\nActions\nBuild Cache"
-   entity externalentity_AWingetCommunityRepositorymicrosoftwingetpkgs_7113ed0f48 as "A-09: Winget\nCommunity\nRepository\n(microsoft/winget-pkgs)"
+   entity externalentity_AWingetCommunityRepositorymicrosoftwingetpkgs_7113ed0f48 as "A-28: Winget\nCommunity\nRepository\n(microsoft/winget-pkgs)"
 
    actor_DeveloperContributor_d2006ce1bb -> externalentity_AbGitHubRepositoryfeaturebranchesPRs_0291419f72: DF-11: Push commits / open PR
    externalentity_AbGitHubRepositoryfeaturebranchesPRs_0291419f72 -> process_AReleaseGateCodeReview_9345ab4c19: DF-22: PR enters code review
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ Asset Identification
      - Data
      - High / High / High
    * - A-06: GitHub Actions Workflow
-     - CI/CD pipelines: test, build (wheel/msi/deb/rpm), lint, CodeQL, Scorecard, dependency-review, docs, release, winget-publish.  All actions pinned by commit SHA.  harden-runner used in every workflow that executes steps on a runner (egress: block with endpoint allowlist); ci.yml is a dispatcher-only workflow with no runner steps and does not include harden-runner.  winget-publish.yml uses a stored PAT (WINGET_TOKEN, A-10) to submit manifest PRs to the Winget Community Repository (A-09).
+     - CI/CD pipelines: test, build (wheel/msi/deb/rpm), lint, CodeQL, Scorecard, dependency-review, docs, release, winget-publish.  All actions pinned by commit SHA.  harden-runner used in every workflow that executes steps on a runner (egress: block with endpoint allowlist); ci.yml is a dispatcher-only workflow with no runner steps and does not include harden-runner.  winget-publish.yml uses a stored PAT (WINGET_TOKEN, A-29) to submit manifest PRs to the Winget Community Repository (A-28).
      - Process
      - Medium / Medium / Medium
    * - A-07: dfetch Build / Dev Dependencies
@@ -569,11 +569,11 @@ Asset Identification
      - GitHub Actions cache entries written and restored across pipeline runs.  Used to speed up dependency installation (pip, gem) and incremental builds.  Cache-poisoning from forked PRs (DFT-28, SLSA E6: poison the build cache) is mitigated by ref-scoped cache keys: build.yml includes ``${{ github.ref_name }}`` in both ``key`` and ``restore-keys`` (C-033), which isolates PR and release caches per branch so a fork cannot write into the release cache namespace.
      - Datastore
      - High / High / —
-   * - A-09: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
-     - The Windows Package Manager Community Repository where the dfetch ``DFetch-org.DFetch`` manifest is hosted (https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs).  CI submits manifest update PRs via ``vedantmgoyal9/winget-releaser`` using a stored PAT (A-10); PRs are reviewed by ``microsoft/winget-pkgs`` maintainers before merging (C-041).  Manifests contain SHA256 hashes of the installer binary; winget verifies the hash before installation.  A compromised PAT or a fraudulent PR that passes review could redirect consumers to a malicious installer (DFT-35).
+   * - A-28: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
+     - The Windows Package Manager Community Repository where the dfetch ``DFetch-org.DFetch`` manifest is hosted (https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs).  CI submits manifest update PRs via ``vedantmgoyal9/winget-releaser`` using a stored PAT (A-29); PRs are reviewed by ``microsoft/winget-pkgs`` maintainers before merging (C-041).  Manifests contain SHA256 hashes of the installer binary; winget verifies the hash before installation.  A compromised PAT or a fraudulent PR that passes review could redirect consumers to a malicious installer (DFT-35).
      - ExternalEntity
      - High / High / —
-   * - A-10: WINGET_TOKEN PAT
+   * - A-29: WINGET_TOKEN PAT
      - Long-lived classic GitHub Personal Access Token (fine-grained PATs are not supported by the ``vedantmgoyal9/winget-releaser`` action) with ``public_repo`` scope, stored as a GitHub Actions environment secret in the ``winget`` environment.  Used by ``winget-publish.yml`` to push a manifest branch to the pre-existing fork ``dfetch-org/winget-pkgs`` and open a PR against ``microsoft/winget-pkgs``.  Unlike the PyPI OIDC token (A-05) which is short-lived and not stored, this PAT persists indefinitely until rotated.  If exfiltrated from the CI environment, an attacker could submit fraudulent manifest PRs from outside the project's pipeline.
      - Data
      - High / High / —
@@ -677,16 +677,16 @@ Dataflows
 
    * - DF-27: Winget manifest PR submission
      - A-02: GitHub Actions Infrastructure
-     - A-09: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
+     - A-28: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
      - HTTPS
 
    * - DF-28: winget install dfetch
      - Consumer / End User
-     - A-09: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
+     - A-28: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
      - HTTPS
 
    * - DF-29: Consumer downloads MSI via winget
-     - A-09: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
+     - A-28: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
      - Consumer / End User
      - HTTPS
 
@@ -728,6 +728,14 @@ Threats
        | **STRIDE:** T S
        | **Status:** Mitigate
      - C-021
+   * - DFT-06
+     - Command injection via unsanitised subprocess input
+     - A-01: GitHub Repository (main / protected)
+     - | **Sev:** 🟠H
+       | **Risk:** 🟠H
+       | **STRIDE:** T E
+       | **Status:** Mitigate
+     - C-015 (CodeQL) and C-017 (bandit) perform static analysis that detects command injection patterns before code reaches production.
    * - DFT-07
      - CI/CD secret exfiltration via supply-chain attack on build environment
      - A-08: Python Build (wheel / sdist)
@@ -856,9 +864,17 @@ Threats
        | **STRIDE:** T
        | **Status:** Mitigate
      - C-038
+   * - DFT-34
+     - Long-lived stored credential enables persistent unauthorised publication after exfiltration
+     - A-29: WINGET_TOKEN PAT
+     - | **Sev:** 🟠H
+       | **Risk:** 🟠H
+       | **STRIDE:** I T
+       | **Status:** Mitigate
+     - C-042
    * - DFT-35
      - Compromised publish credential enables malicious installer URL injection via package manifest submission
-     - A-09: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
+     - A-28: Winget Community Repository (microsoft/winget-pkgs)
      - | **Sev:** 🟠H
        | **Risk:** 🟠H
        | **STRIDE:** T S

doc/explanation/threat_model_usage.rst

@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ Asset Identification
      - Datastore
      - Critical / Critical / High
    * - A-15: SBOM Output (CycloneDX)
-     - CycloneDX JSON/XML produced by ``dfetch report -t sbom``.  Enumerates vendored components with PURL, license, and hash.  Falsification hides actual dependencies from downstream CVE scanners.  NOTE: this SBOM covers vendored deps only - dfetch itself has a separate machine-readable SBOM published on PyPI (see A-04 in tm_supply_chain.py).
+     - CycloneDX JSON/XML produced by ``dfetch report -t sbom``.  Enumerates vendored components with PURL, license, and hash.  Falsification hides actual dependencies from downstream CVE scanners.  NOTE: this SBOM covers vendored deps only - dfetch itself has a separate machine-readable SBOM published on PyPI (see A-03 in tm_supply_chain.py).
      - Datastore
      - High / High / —
    * - A-16: VCS Credentials
@@ -952,6 +952,14 @@ Threats
        | **STRIDE:** T S
        | **Status:** Mitigate
      - C-005 mitigates archive deps when hash present. Git/SVN: no integrity mechanism; pinning to an immutable commit SHA is recommended but not enforced by dfetch.
+   * - DFT-06
+     - Command injection via unsanitised subprocess input
+     - A-22: dfetch Process
+     - | **Sev:** 🟠H
+       | **Risk:** 🟠H
+       | **STRIDE:** T E
+       | **Status:** Mitigate
+     - C-006 suppresses interactive credential prompts for Git and SVN; C-007 invokes all external commands with ``shell=False`` and list-form arguments, eliminating the shell-injection vector for non-interactive VCS operations.
    * - DFT-07
      - CI/CD secret exfiltration via supply-chain attack on build environment
      - A-25: Patch Application (patch-ng)
@@ -1190,10 +1198,6 @@ Controls
      - Manifest input validation
      - DFT-04, DFT-08
      - StrictYAML schema with ``SAFE_STR = Regex(r"^[^\x00-\x1F\x7F-\x9F]*$")`` rejects control characters in all string fields.  ``dfetch/manifest/schema.py``
-   * - C-045
-     - Plaintext transport detection
-     - DFT-26
-     - ``plaintext_warning()`` (``dfetch/manifest/project.py``) inspects the resolved remote URL immediately before each VCS command is issued (inside the ``check_for_update`` and ``update`` spinners in ``subproject.py``).  If the scheme is ``http://``, ``git://``, or ``svn://``, a visible warning is emitted naming the redacted URL (credentials stripped from the userinfo component) and recommending ``https://`` or ``svn+ssh://``.  Detection only — dfetch still proceeds with the plaintext connection; the control raises user awareness but does not enforce scheme selection.  ``dfetch/manifest/project.py, dfetch/project/subproject.py``
    * - C-034
      - Hash algorithm allowlist (SHA-256/384/512 only)
      - DFT-30
@@ -1202,3 +1206,7 @@ Controls
      - Persisted-metadata credential redaction
      - DFT-13
      - ``Metadata.dump()`` rebuilds the netloc of every persisted URL from ``parsed.hostname`` and ``parsed.port`` via ``urllib.parse.urlsplit`` / ``urlunsplit``, dropping any ``user:password@`` userinfo before writing ``.dfetch_data.yaml``.  The same stripper is applied to each ``dependencies[].remote_url`` entry (git submodule, svn:external) so a credential in a nested upstream URL also never reaches disk.  The in-memory ``Metadata`` object held by the running command keeps the original URL — only the on-disk representation is redacted, so an in-flight authenticated fetch is unaffected.  ``dfetch/project/metadata.py``
+   * - C-045
+     - Plaintext transport detection
+     - DFT-26
+     - ``plaintext_warning()`` (``dfetch/manifest/project.py``) inspects the resolved remote URL immediately before each VCS command is issued (inside the ``check_for_update`` and ``update`` spinners in ``subproject.py``).  If the scheme is ``http://``, ``git://``, or ``svn://``, a visible warning is emitted naming the redacted URL (credentials stripped from the userinfo component) and recommending ``https://`` or ``svn+ssh://``.  Detection only — dfetch still proceeds with the plaintext connection; the control raises user awareness but does not enforce scheme selection.  ``dfetch/manifest/project.py, dfetch/project/subproject.py``

security/README.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ python -m security.compliance \
 
 This produces:
 
-- `security/dfetch.component-definition.json` — OSCAL 1.1.2 Component Definition implementing
+- `security/dfetch.component-definition.json` — OSCAL 1.2.2 Component Definition implementing
   prEN 40000-1-4 Security Objectives for dfetch
 - `doc/explanation/compliance_track.rst` — human-readable RST (built into the Sphinx docs)
 

security/dfetch.component-definition.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
     "uuid": "eddc2e8c-a2ae-5a42-8d35-88f5c2af55b2",
     "metadata": {
       "title": "dfetch CRA Compliance Component Definition",
-      "last-modified": "2026-06-17T00:00:00Z",
-      "version": "0.15.0",
+      "last-modified": "2026-07-02T00:00:00Z",
+      "version": "0.14.0",
       "oscal-version": "1.2.2",
       "document-ids": [
         {
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
         "props": [
           {
             "name": "software-version",
-            "value": "0.15.0"
+            "value": "0.14.0"
           },
           {
             "name": "asset-type",
@@ -1367,4 +1367,4 @@
       ]
     }
   }
-}
+}

security/tm_controls_data.py

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ def to_pytm(self) -> str:
     Control(
         id="C-041",
         name="Winget manifest PRs reviewed by community maintainers",
-        assets=["A-09"],
+        assets=["A-28"],
         threats=["DFT-35"],
         reference=".github/workflows/winget-publish.yml",
         description=(
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ def to_pytm(self) -> str:
     Control(
         id="C-042",
         name="WINGET_TOKEN scoped to dedicated Winget environment",
-        assets=["A-10"],
+        assets=["A-29"],
         threats=["DFT-34"],
         reference=".github/workflows/winget-publish.yml",
         description=(

security/tm_render.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 import re
 import sys
 from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Any
 
 from pytm import TM, Data, Element
@@ -120,6 +121,46 @@ def _render_asset_rows(
     return "".join(_asset_row(e, cia) for e in assets)
 
 
+@dataclass
+class _CatalogRow:
+    """Stand-in finding for a threat documented via ``ThreatResponse`` only.
+
+    Two situations leave a responded-to threat without any pytm finding:
+    the mitigation is already modelled in the element properties, so the
+    threat's condition no longer matches (e.g. DFT-06 with parameterized
+    subprocess input), or the threat targets ``Data`` assets, which pytm's
+    ``resolve()`` never evaluates (it iterates ``TM._elements`` only, while
+    ``Data`` lives in ``TM._data`` — e.g. DFT-34).  Rendering these rows
+    from the threat catalog keeps the decision visible in the report instead
+    of silently dropping it.
+    """
+
+    threat_id: str
+    description: str
+    severity: str
+    target: str = "—"
+
+
+def _validate_threat_coverage(
+    findings: Any,
+    responses: list[ThreatResponse],
+    catalog: dict[str, Any],
+) -> None:
+    """Fail generation when findings and responses have drifted apart.
+
+    Every pytm finding must have a documented ``ThreatResponse``, and every
+    response must reference a threat that exists in the catalog.  Raising here
+    means an undocumented threat can never silently render as an empty row.
+    """
+    resp_ids = {r.threat_id for r in responses}
+    unknown = sorted(resp_ids - set(catalog))
+    if unknown:
+        raise ValueError(f"Responses reference unknown threat IDs: {unknown}")
+    unhandled = sorted({f.threat_id for f in findings} - resp_ids)
+    if unhandled:
+        raise ValueError(f"Findings without a ThreatResponse: {unhandled}")
+
+
 def _render_threat_rows(
     tm: Any, controls: list[Control], responses: list[ThreatResponse]
 ) -> str:
@@ -129,16 +170,31 @@ def _render_threat_rows(
     threat that applies to many elements produces many byte-identical rows.
     Collapse them to a single row documented against the threat's canonical
     target (``ThreatResponse.target`` when set, otherwise the matched element).
+
+    Responses whose threat produced no pytm finding are rendered from the
+    threat catalog instead (see ``_CatalogRow``), so every documented risk
+    decision appears in the table.
     """
     findings = tm.findings
-    if not findings:
+    if not findings and not responses:
         return ""
 
+    catalog: dict[str, Any] = {t.id: t for t in getattr(TM, "_threats", [])}
+    _validate_threat_coverage(findings, responses, catalog)
+
     resp_map: dict[str, ThreatResponse] = {r.threat_id: r for r in responses}
 
     representative: dict[str, Any] = {}
     for f in findings:
         representative.setdefault(f.threat_id, f)
+    for r in responses:
+        if r.threat_id not in representative:
+            threat = catalog[r.threat_id]
+            representative[r.threat_id] = _CatalogRow(
+                threat_id=r.threat_id,
+                description=str(threat.description),
+                severity=str(threat.severity),
+            )
 
     def _row(f: Any) -> str:
         resp = resp_map.get(f.threat_id)