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update(falco_rules): exclude systemd helpers from Read sensitive file… #374

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update(falco_rules): exclude systemd helpers from Read sensitive file… #374

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13 changes: 13 additions & 0 deletions rules/falco_rules.yaml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -427,10 +427,23 @@
and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow
and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities
and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers
and not systemd_sensitive_file_readers
output: Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program | file=%fd.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty
priority: WARNING
tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555]

# systemd spawns short-lived helper processes that legitimately read sensitive
# account/PAM files (e.g. /etc/shadow, /etc/pam.d/*) during normal operation.
# These helpers report a bare-number or comm-truncated proc.name, so they cannot
# be matched by name; proc.exepath (kernel-resolved, unspoofable) is used instead,
# and each entry is anchored to its expected systemd parent to keep it tight.
# - systemd-executor: unit (re)exec deserialize handoff (see falcosecurity/falco#3480)
# - systemd-userwork: userdb (User/Group Record Lookup) query worker
# The rule "Read sensitive file untrusted" uses this macro to avoid FPs.
- macro: systemd_sensitive_file_readers
condition: >
((proc.pname=systemd and proc.exepath=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor) or
(proc.pname=systemd-userdbd and proc.exepath=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-userwork))
- macro: postgres_running_wal_e
condition: (proc.pname=postgres and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir /etc/wal-e.d/env /usr/local/bin/wal-e" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir \"/run/etc/wal-e.d/env\" wal-g wal-push"))

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