chore(deps): update security updates [security] - #519
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✅ Approve — automated reviewThe dependency upgrades and corresponding checksums are consistent across all affected Go modules. No regressions or actionable issues are evident in the patch. No findings. |
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ℹ Artifact update noticeFile name: deployment/operator/go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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File name: go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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File name: tools/kubectl-stacks/go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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This PR contains the following updates:
v5.19.1->v5.19.2v0.37.0->v0.40.0v0.37.0->v0.40.0GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-71556
Impact
A symlink traversal issue in
go-gitcould allow worktree operations to modify files outside the intended worktree path.The
worktreeFilesystemwrapper rejected dangerous path strings, including paths containing.git, parent-directory components, or control characters. However, it did not prevent filesystem operations from following symbolic links that were already present in the worktree.As a result, a path that is safe when evaluated as a string could still resolve into the repository's Git metadata directory. For example, if
sis a symbolic link to.git, writing tos/configwould modify.git/config.A symbolic link at the final path component could also be followed. For example, if
spoints directly to.git/config, openingsfor writing with truncation could overwrite the repository configuration.Exploitation requires an attacker to be able to introduce or control a symbolic link in the worktree and cause the application to perform a write through that path.
Applications using
storage/memoryfor their Storer, orgo-billy/memfsfor theirWorktree, are not affected by this vulnerability.Patches
The issue has been addressed by making the worktree filesystem wrapper a symlink-safe boundary.
Worktree operations now reject paths where an existing symbolic link in any path component could cause the operation to escape the intended worktree location, including symbolic links at the final component.
Users of filesystem-backed worktrees should upgrade to a patched version.
Credits
Thanks to @kodareef5 for reporting this issue and working with the go-git security team toward its resolution. 🥇
We would also like to thank @HughLewis20, who independently reported the same issue while a fix was already in progress.
CVE-2026-71557
Impact
A path traversal issue in
go-gitcould allow malicious reference names to access files outside the repository's intended reference storage.Loose references are stored under
.git/<reference-name>. The reference name was previously used as a path without verifying that the resolved path remained within the reference storage. A name such asrefs/heads/../../configcould therefore resolve to unrelated repository metadata such as.git/configor.git/HEAD.A malicious Git server could advertise such a reference name. The name may also survive refspec mapping; for example, it could be mapped to
refs/remotes/origin/../../configduring a clone or fetch operation.This vulnerability affects filesystem-backed repositories using the
storage/filesystempackage and itsdotgitreference storage. Users relying exclusively on the in-memory storage implementation,storage/memory, are not affected, because reference names are not resolved as filesystem paths.Exploitation requires an application using
go-gitwith filesystem-backed storage to interact with a malicious Git server or otherwise process attacker-controlled reference names.Patches
The issue has been addressed by validating reference names at the
dotgitstorage entry points and rejecting names whose resolved paths could escape the reference storage.Users of filesystem-backed storage should upgrade to a patched version.
Workarounds
Applications that exclusively use
storage/memoryare not affected and do not require a workaround for this vulnerability.For applications using filesystem-backed storage, avoid cloning from or fetching from untrusted Git servers until an upgrade is possible.
Applications that directly construct or process reference names may also validate them before passing them to filesystem-backed
go-gitstorage. Application-level validation should only be considered a temporary mitigation and does not replace upgrading to a patched version.References
Credits
Thanks to @Saku0512 for reporting this issue and @Sahana2524 for proposing the initial fix. 🙇
go-git: Worktree operations may follow symlinks
CVE-2026-71556 / GHSA-hc8v-wwc9-vgxm
More information
Details
Impact
A symlink traversal issue in
go-gitcould allow worktree operations to modify files outside the intended worktree path.The
worktreeFilesystemwrapper rejected dangerous path strings, including paths containing.git, parent-directory components, or control characters. However, it did not prevent filesystem operations from following symbolic links that were already present in the worktree.As a result, a path that is safe when evaluated as a string could still resolve into the repository's Git metadata directory. For example, if
sis a symbolic link to.git, writing tos/configwould modify.git/config.A symbolic link at the final path component could also be followed. For example, if
spoints directly to.git/config, openingsfor writing with truncation could overwrite the repository configuration.Exploitation requires an attacker to be able to introduce or control a symbolic link in the worktree and cause the application to perform a write through that path.
Applications using
storage/memoryfor their Storer, orgo-billy/memfsfor theirWorktree, are not affected by this vulnerability.Patches
The issue has been addressed by making the worktree filesystem wrapper a symlink-safe boundary.
Worktree operations now reject paths where an existing symbolic link in any path component could cause the operation to escape the intended worktree location, including symbolic links at the final component.
Users of filesystem-backed worktrees should upgrade to a patched version.
Credits
Thanks to @kodareef5 for reporting this issue and working with the go-git security team toward its resolution. 🥇
We would also like to thank @HughLewis20, who independently reported the same issue while a fix was already in progress.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
go-git: Malicious reference names may modify files outside the reference storage
CVE-2026-71557 / GHSA-qgq7-7hm3-q39j
More information
Details
Impact
A path traversal issue in
go-gitcould allow malicious reference names to access files outside the repository's intended reference storage.Loose references are stored under
.git/<reference-name>. The reference name was previously used as a path without verifying that the resolved path remained within the reference storage. A name such asrefs/heads/../../configcould therefore resolve to unrelated repository metadata such as.git/configor.git/HEAD.A malicious Git server could advertise such a reference name. The name may also survive refspec mapping; for example, it could be mapped to
refs/remotes/origin/../../configduring a clone or fetch operation.This vulnerability affects filesystem-backed repositories using the
storage/filesystempackage and itsdotgitreference storage. Users relying exclusively on the in-memory storage implementation,storage/memory, are not affected, because reference names are not resolved as filesystem paths.Exploitation requires an application using
go-gitwith filesystem-backed storage to interact with a malicious Git server or otherwise process attacker-controlled reference names.Patches
The issue has been addressed by validating reference names at the
dotgitstorage entry points and rejecting names whose resolved paths could escape the reference storage.Users of filesystem-backed storage should upgrade to a patched version.
Workarounds
Applications that exclusively use
storage/memoryare not affected and do not require a workaround for this vulnerability.For applications using filesystem-backed storage, avoid cloning from or fetching from untrusted Git servers until an upgrade is possible.
Applications that directly construct or process reference names may also validate them before passing them to filesystem-backed
go-gitstorage. Application-level validation should only be considered a temporary mitigation and does not replace upgrading to a patched version.References
Credits
Thanks to @Saku0512 for reporting this issue and @Sahana2524 for proposing the initial fix. 🙇
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Ignore unrelated, unauthenticated hashes in Lookup in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb
CVE-2026-56864 / GO-2026-6180
More information
Details
A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log.
This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log.
In order to determine if you have been affected:
rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Fix transparency log tile verification bypass in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog
CVE-2026-56865 / GO-2026-6179
More information
Details
A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two sumdb tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check and persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module cache.
This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log.
All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents.
In order to determine if you have been affected:
rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
go-git/go-git (github.com/go-git/go-git/v5)
v5.19.2Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: go-git/go-git@v5.19.1...v5.19.2
Configuration
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