🔒 Fix auto-updater vulnerability by verifying app signature#53
🔒 Fix auto-updater vulnerability by verifying app signature#53
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🎯 What:
The auto-updater in AppDelegate.swift was vulnerable because it downloaded a DMG and blindly copied the Click2Minimize.app file from the mount into /Applications without any validation.
An attacker capable of spoofing the GitHub API response or performing a MITM attack could serve a malicious DMG containing an unauthorized application. If left unfixed, the victim's device would execute this unverified application without proper warnings, as the updater would bypass Gatekeeper and directly replace the application.
🛡️ Solution:
Added verifyAppSignature which validates the downloaded application's signature by matching it against the currently running application's designated requirement using the Security framework (SecStaticCodeCheckValidity). The DMG is only copied to /Applications if the signature is valid. Also improved hdiutil interaction by transitioning from the deprecated launch and launchPath to run and executableURL, and dynamically reading the mount path securely from a plist using readabilityHandler.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 6472382904876156078 started by @hatimhtm