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chore(deps-dev): bump @types/node from 26.0.1 to 26.1.1 - #69

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chore(deps-dev): bump @types/node from 26.0.1 to 26.1.1#69
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@dependabot dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Jul 13, 2026

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Bumps @types/node from 26.0.1 to 26.1.1.

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@dependabot dependabot Bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Jul 13, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Jul 13, 2026

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🛡️ supply-chain-guard Scan Report

Property Value
Target .
Type directory
Time 2026-07-19T08:41:03.361Z
Duration 229ms
Risk Score 14/100 (MEDIUM)

Summary

Scanned 68 of 76 files.

🟡 2 medium | 🔵 2 low

Findings

🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow requests OIDC id-token:write permission. If combined with unreviewed third-party actions or outbound curl, an attacker can steal the OIDC token to impersonate the workflow's cloud identity.

  • Rule: GHA_OIDC_WRITE_PERM
  • File: .github/workflows/ci.yml:49
  • Match: id-token: write
  • Recommendation: Audit all steps in this workflow when id-token:write is set. Ensure no third-party action or run step can exfiltrate the OIDC token. Scope permissions as narrowly as possible.

🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow "ci.yml" accesses secrets and has network egress. Verify secrets are not sent to external endpoints.

  • Rule: WORKFLOW_SECRET_TO_UPLOAD_PATH
  • File: .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • Recommendation: Audit this workflow for secret-to-network paths. Minimize secret scoping.

🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" uses a version tag instead of a commit SHA. Tags can be force-pushed to point to different commits.

  • Rule: GHA_TAG_NOT_SHA
  • File: .github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:21
  • Match: homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5
  • Recommendation: Consider pinning this action to a full commit SHA for maximum security. Tags can be moved to point to malicious code.

🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" is from third-party owner "homeofe". Third-party actions can be compromised.

  • Rule: GHA_THIRD_PARTY_ACTION
  • File: .github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:21
  • Match: homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5
  • Recommendation: Pin "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" to a specific commit SHA and audit the action source code before use.

Recommendations

  • Review the listed findings and assess whether they represent legitimate functionality or potential threats.

Generated by supply-chain-guard

@dependabot
dependabot Bot force-pushed the dependabot/npm_and_yarn/types/node-26.1.1 branch from e482d15 to 90210f0 Compare July 19, 2026 07:06
Bumps [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) from 26.0.1 to 26.1.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 26.1.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot
dependabot Bot force-pushed the dependabot/npm_and_yarn/types/node-26.1.1 branch from 90210f0 to 3d59c9e Compare July 19, 2026 08:40
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