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chore(deps): bump actions/setup-node from 6 to 7 - #74

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chore(deps): bump actions/setup-node from 6 to 7#74
dependabot[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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dependabot/github_actions/actions/setup-node-7

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Bumps actions/setup-node from 6 to 7.

Release notes

Sourced from actions/setup-node's releases.

v7.0.0

What's Changed

Enhancements:

Bug fixes:

Documentation updates:

Dependency update:

New Contributors

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6...v7.0.0

v6.5.0

What's Changed

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6.4.0...v6.5.0

v6.4.0

What's Changed

Dependency updates:

New Contributors

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6...v6.4.0

v6.3.0

What's Changed

Enhancements:

... (truncated)

Commits
  • 8207627 Migrate to ESM and upgrade dependencies (#1574)
  • 04be95c Add cache-primary-key and cache-matched-key as outputs (#1577)
  • 7c2c68d docs: Update caching recommendations to mitigate cache poisoning risks (#1567)
  • 6a61c03 Merge pull request #1569 from jasongin/update-actions-cache-5.1.0
  • 30eb73b Resolve high-severity audit issues
  • 4e1a87a Update dist
  • 360237f Strict equality
  • 4f8aac5 Bump @​actions/cache to 5.1.0, log cache write denied
  • f4a67bb Only use mirrorToken in getManifest if it's provided (#1548)
  • 0355742 Remove dummy NODE_AUTH_TOKEN export (#1558)
  • Additional commits viewable in compare view

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Bumps [actions/setup-node](https://github.com/actions/setup-node) from 6 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/setup-node/releases)
- [Commits](actions/setup-node@v6...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/setup-node
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot dependabot Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file github_actions Pull requests that update GitHub Actions code labels Jul 15, 2026
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🛡️ supply-chain-guard Scan Report

Property Value
Target .
Type directory
Time 2026-07-15T02:24:19.658Z
Duration 231ms
Risk Score 14/100 (MEDIUM)

Summary

Scanned 71 of 81 files.

🟡 2 medium | 🔵 2 low

Findings

🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow requests OIDC id-token:write permission. If combined with unreviewed third-party actions or outbound curl, an attacker can steal the OIDC token to impersonate the workflow's cloud identity.

  • Rule: GHA_OIDC_WRITE_PERM
  • File: .github/workflows/ci.yml:49
  • Match: id-token: write
  • Recommendation: Audit all steps in this workflow when id-token:write is set. Ensure no third-party action or run step can exfiltrate the OIDC token. Scope permissions as narrowly as possible.

🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow "ci.yml" accesses secrets and has network egress. Verify secrets are not sent to external endpoints.

  • Rule: WORKFLOW_SECRET_TO_UPLOAD_PATH
  • File: .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • Recommendation: Audit this workflow for secret-to-network paths. Minimize secret scoping.

🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" uses a version tag instead of a commit SHA. Tags can be force-pushed to point to different commits.

  • Rule: GHA_TAG_NOT_SHA
  • File: .github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:21
  • Match: homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5
  • Recommendation: Consider pinning this action to a full commit SHA for maximum security. Tags can be moved to point to malicious code.

🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" is from third-party owner "homeofe". Third-party actions can be compromised.

  • Rule: GHA_THIRD_PARTY_ACTION
  • File: .github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:21
  • Match: homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5
  • Recommendation: Pin "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v5" to a specific commit SHA and audit the action source code before use.

Recommendations

  • Review the listed findings and assess whether they represent legitimate functionality or potential threats.

Generated by supply-chain-guard

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