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Security: jolarca-dev/jolarca-data

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy — jolarca-data

Severity doctrine

Any incident involving personal data in this repository or in the warehouse it manages is the highest severity class. The entire design of this repository (pseudonymize-at-ingestion, field allow-lists, aggregate-only compliance marts) exists so that a warehouse compromise cannot become a personal-data breach. Finding cleartext PII downstream of ingestion means that boundary failed — treat it as such.

Order of notification:

  1. DPO (jolarca-compliance) — immediately; GDPR 72h assessment clock is the DPO's, and the PII runbook is DPO-controlled.
  2. Data platform owner (repo owner) — immediately, in parallel.
  3. Security function / incident commander (jolarca-infrastructure runbooks).
  4. General counsel (jolarca-legal) if regulatory notification becomes likely.

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities and data incidents privately. Never open a public issue, paste credentials into chat, or describe affected records in a tracker.

  • Security function contact: per jolarca-infrastructure/SECURITY.md.
  • DPO contact: per jolarca-compliance (RoPA point of contact).
  • Use the pii_incident issue template only for non-sensitive metadata (where, when, which pipeline) — never the data itself.

Scope-specific risks

Risk Control
Warehouse credentials committed gitleaks pre-commit + CI; .env* gitignored; profiles.yml.example documents env vars only
Cleartext PII lands in warehouse pseudonymizer at ingestion boundary (unit-tested); field allow-list contracts; scheduled pii-scan.yml
Cleartext PII committed to seed/fixtures fixtures are faker-seeded synthetic; pre-commit PII pattern scan; validate-seed.py
Re-identification via join of marts compliance marts are aggregates only; verify-anonymization.py adversarial sampling
Retention bypassed retention jobs driven by governance/retention-map.md; legal holds suspend, not delete
SAQ-A boundary erosion Stripe extract takes charge/payout metadata only — never PAN or full card data

Do not

  • Do not connect extraction jobs to production with write privileges — read-replica, read-only role, least privilege (ADR-0002).
  • Do not copy production dumps, *.dump, or CSV extracts into this repository — they are gitignored for a reason.
  • Do not "fix" a PII finding by quietly deleting history; follow docs/runbooks/pii-detected-in-warehouse.md so the DPO can assess notification duty.

There aren't any published security advisories