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HarryR merged 1 commit into from
Jul 13, 2026
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profile: drop boot-chain diagram; fix stale /data crypto claim #1

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10 changes: 2 additions & 8 deletions profile/README.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6,16 +6,9 @@ Lock.Boot boots a machine through a short chain of independently-verified, indep

## The boot chain

```
firmware (UEFI Secure Boot)
└─▶ stage0 db-signed UEFI netboot loader — the root of trust (measured into PCR 4)
└─▶ stage1 netboot UKI: Linux + a PID-1 bootloader (measured into PCR 14)
└─▶ stage2 your workload
```

- **stage0** — a kernel-less UEFI application, the only Secure Boot `db`-signed link. Firmware measures it; it then downloads a UKI over plain HTTP, admits it by a pin/signature carried in cloud metadata, measures it into PCR 14, and chain-loads it. No disk image required.
- **stage1** — the netboot **UKI** (a Unified Kernel Image: Linux kernel + minimal initramfs + the `stage1` bootloader running as PID 1). It fetches a stage2 payload, verifies + measures it, produces a TPM attestation, and `exec`s it.
- **stage2** — your application, run as PID 1 with an attestation document describing the whole chain.
- **stage2** — your workload, run as PID 1 with an attestation of the whole chain. The reference [**stage2**](https://github.com/lockboot/stage2) is a *payload-agnostic loader*: append any container image and it boots it as an immutable dm-verity root under an ephemeral overlay, with TPM-bound encrypted persistence — "run this Docker container under Lock.Boot." Every stage is independently verified, measured, and **replaceable** — swap in your own.

## Properties

Expand All @@ -31,6 +24,7 @@ firmware (UEFI Secure Boot)
|---|---|
| [**stage0**](https://github.com/lockboot/stage0) | UEFI netboot loader — the Secure Boot root of trust |
| [**stage1**](https://github.com/lockboot/stage1) | The netboot UKI (Linux `stage1` bootloader) + `mkuki` builder + example stage2 |
| [**stage2**](https://github.com/lockboot/stage2) | The reference stage2 **loader**: seals a container image into a measured, dm-verity + encrypted, TPM-bound bootable form (append your image, pivot onto it, `exec /init`) |
| [**vaportpm**](https://github.com/lockboot/vaportpm) | From-scratch TPM 2.0 attestation library (`no_std`-capable), shared by stage0 and stage1 |
| [**vaportpm-zk**](https://github.com/lockboot/vaportpm-zk) | Zero-knowledge attestation experiments over vaportpm |
| [**workspace**](https://github.com/lockboot/workspace) | Reproducible multi-repo dev environment (shared toolchain + `lockboot:build`/`lockboot:harness` images) |
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