[examples] SecondFi Cardano predictable key-generation drain (T11.004)#1
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… -> 647) SecondFi (Cardano web wallet) disclosed 2026-06-23 that its native web-wallet key-generation software produced private keys with predictable randomness, so the full generated cohort is derivable, including wallets not yet drained. Confirmed ~16M ADA (~$2.4M) stolen across ~178 wallets (374 addresses per SecondFi); SlowMist puts total exposure up to ~129M ADA (~$20M at ~$0.15/ADA). Maps to T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key Generation) -- OAK's first non-EVM / wallet-provider-software anchor for the class (existing anchors are EVM/Profanity). The ~129M ADA "rescue to a third-party custodian" SecondFi describes is disputed: SlowMist and community trackers link the large flows to attacker-tagged addresses, and an attacker sweeping every derivable key is on-chain indistinguishable from a custodial rescue of the same wallets. Documented per OAK neutral framing -- mechanism confirmed, disposition recorded as contested metadata; attribution pseudonymous. Entry marked developing / partially-disputed with an explicit re-map path (add T5.007 / T11.010 if the flow is confirmed operator-controlled). Does not amplify the "do nothing / don't restore your seed / submit a claim" guidance: for a weak-entropy cohort, immediate rotation to a cleanly generated key is the only protective action a holder can take unilaterally; inaction is the failure mode (T11.004 half-life-of-known-vulnerability tail). Backlink: T11.004. Regenerated STATS/BACKLOG + index.html count (646 -> 647; bibtex steady 1555 / inline-only; pseudonymous 305 -> 306; T11 144 -> 145). Exports (oak.json/oak-stix.json) and SPECS.md unchanged -- examples are not part of those artifacts. All gates pass: check_linkage OK, check_backlinks 0 hard / 0 warn, check_integrity clean, markdownlint 0 errors, verify_citations clean. Signed-off-by: Dmytro Chystiakov <dlchistyakov@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
Adds a worked example for the SecondFi Cardano (ADA) wallet drain disclosed 2026-06-23, mapped to OAK-T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key Generation).
examples/2026-06-secondfi-cardano-web-wallet-predictable-key-generation-drain.mdtechniques/T11.004-insufficient-entropy-key-generation.mdSTATS.md,BACKLOG.md,index.htmlcount (646 → 647)Why this is a clean T11.004 anchor
Multiple outlets and SlowMist confirm the root cause: SecondFi's native Cardano web-wallet key-generation software produced private keys with predictable randomness, so the entire generated cohort is derivable — including wallets not yet drained. This is OAK's first non-EVM / wallet-provider-software anchor for the class (existing anchors are EVM/Profanity), and it re-exercises both load-bearing T11.004 properties: cohort-computable exposure and the half-life-of-known-vulnerability tail.
16M ADA ($2.4M) across ~178 wallets (374 addresses per SecondFi).129M ADA ($20M) per SlowMist.Developing / partially disputed — handled per OAK neutral framing
The ~129M ADA "rescue to a third-party custodian" SecondFi describes is disputed: SlowMist and community trackers link the large flows to attacker-tagged addresses (
addr1q8g8c…7vuz99), and on-chain a cohort-wide sweep of derivable keys by an attacker is indistinguishable from a custodial rescue of the same wallets.Validation
All gates pass:
check_linkageOK ·check_backlinks0 hard / 0 warn ·check_integrityclean ·markdownlint0 errors ·verify_citationsclean. Exports (oak.json/oak-stix.json) andSPECS.mdunchanged (examples aren't part of those artifacts). Citations are inline-only (no new bibtex entries).🤖 Generated with Claude Code