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Security: patrickking67/godmode

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

Godmode follows SemVer. The current minor and the previous minor receive security fixes.

Version Supported
1.3.x yes
< 1.3 no

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not file a public GitHub issue for security reports.

Use GitHub Security Advisories for private disclosure.

Include:

  • A clear description of the issue
  • Reproduction steps or proof-of-concept
  • Affected version(s)
  • Your assessment of impact

We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and ship a fix in the next patch release. Coordinated disclosure is appreciated; we will credit reporters in the changelog unless you prefer to stay anonymous.

Security model

Scope note: the shipped plugin (commands, agents, hooks, MCP wiring) runs no server and stores no data. The local server, hybrid memory, and dashboard described below are on the roadmap; their security model is documented here ahead of implementation.

Godmode runs a local Hono server bound to 127.0.0.1 only. Every request requires a bearer token stored at ~/.godmode/auth.token (file mode 0600). Hook ingestion uses the same token, set via GODMODE_TOKEN environment variable injected by the plugin install.

No CORS open. No external bind. No embedded credentials. MCP servers that need auth read credentials from environment variables only; Godmode never embeds keys.

In scope

These describe the intended security boundary once the server and memory surfaces ship. They are listed now so reports can be filed and triaged as implementation proceeds.

  • Local server auth bypass (request to /api/* without valid bearer)
  • Hook-injection RCE (hook payloads triggering arbitrary code execution)
  • MCP credential leak (logs, error messages, or memory observations containing secrets)
  • Sandbox escape via skill / agent definitions
  • Memory exfiltration between projects (data from project A surfacing in project B through Godmode)
  • SQL injection in /api/observations search or other parameterized endpoints
  • WebSocket auth bypass

Out of scope

  • Physical access compromise of the host machine
  • Social engineering of the user
  • User-misconfigured MCP servers or third-party plugins
  • Vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies that have been patched but not yet rolled in (please report upstream; we'll update in the next patch release)

Hall of fame

(empty for now; your name could be here)

There aren't any published security advisories