| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
latest main |
✅ |
| older commits | ❌ |
Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, please report vulnerabilities privately by emailing security@avarok.net with:
- Description — What the vulnerability is and its potential impact
- Reproduction steps — Minimal steps to reproduce the issue
- Environment — OS, CUDA version, GPU model, Rust version
- Affected component — Which crate or kernel is affected
We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and provide an initial assessment within 7 days.
Atlas is an inference server that runs locally with GPU access. The primary threat surface includes:
- CUDA kernel safety — Out-of-bounds memory access, buffer overflows in GPU kernels
- HTTP API — Input validation on the OpenAI-compatible endpoint (
spark-server) - Weight loading — Malicious safetensor files, path traversal during model loading
- Unsafe Rust — Atlas uses
unsafeblocks for CUDA FFI; these are high-priority review targets
Atlas runs one automated security check in CI:
cargo deny— Audits dependencies for known advisories, license compliance, and banned crates. Runs on every pull request, on pushes tomainthat touchCargo.toml/Cargo.lock/deny.toml, and weekly. See.github/workflows/security.yml.
There is no automated static analysis of the CUDA kernel sources. Kernel
memory safety is covered by human review and by the runtime kernel audit, not
by a CI tool. This section previously advertised a cppcheck job that has
never existed in this repository; claiming a control you do not run is worse
than claiming none, because it tells a reader a class of defect is already
being looked for.
We follow coordinated disclosure. Once a fix is available, we will:
- Merge the fix to
main - Tag a release
- Credit the reporter (unless anonymity is requested)