Harden GitHub Actions workflow (PSIRT-0328599349)#59
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Pin all actions to full commit SHAs and apply least-privilege token permissions, addressing the GitHub Actions vulnerability classes flagged by PSIRT-0328599349. - Pin every `uses:` to a commit SHA with a version comment, so a retagged or compromised upstream release cannot inject code into CI. This covers the third-party action DeLaGuardo/setup-clojure (the main supply-chain exposure) as well as the actions/* steps. - Add a top-level `permissions: contents: read` block so the default GITHUB_TOKEN is least-privilege. The workflow only builds, lints and tests; it performs no writes (deploy to Clojars is a manual lein task, not CI-driven). No behavior change: each SHA is the current tip of the version that was previously referenced (checkout v4.3.1, cache v4.3.0/v3.5.0, setup-java v3.14.1/v2.5.1, setup-clojure 3.7/12.1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Build workflow was auto-disabled (disabled_inactivity) after 60+ days idle, so the required 'all-pr-checks' status never ran on this PR. Re-enabled the workflow; this empty commit re-fires the pull_request run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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#60) Follow-up to #59, addressing the remaining findings from the PSIRT review of build.yml. - Replace the deprecated `::set-output` command with the `$GITHUB_OUTPUT` environment file in the setup job's set-matrix step. GitHub deprecated `::set-output` citing output-injection concerns; the environment file is the supported, safer mechanism. Also fixes a stray trailing `}` in the emitted JSON (`...["test"]}}` -> `...["test"]}`). - Remove `eval` from the test job's run step. `eval 'lein ... ${CMD}'` re-parsed a matrix-derived variable through the shell; passing it as a normal quoted argument (`lein do clean, compile :all, "$CMD"`) removes the eval/command-injection anti-pattern. No behavior change: `matrix.cmd` is hardcoded to `test`, so both jobs run exactly as before (the matrix output is still consumed via `needs.setup.outputs.matrix`). Not in this PR: bumping action major versions (setup-java v2->v4, cache v3->v4) is a runtime-behavior change better handled by Dependabot; the actions are already SHA-pinned as of #59. Co-authored-by: Yann Esposito (Yogsototh) <guillaume@ereteo.net> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Hardens
.github/workflows/build.ymlagainst the GitHub Actions vulnerability classes flagged by PSIRT-0328599349 (advisory: "GitHub Actions associated with threatgrid/flanders may contain vulnerabilities").Two changes, both standard CI supply-chain hardening:
@v4,@3.7, ...) let a retagged or compromised upstream release execute arbitrary code in CI. The primary exposure was the third-party actionDeLaGuardo/setup-clojure; theactions/*steps are pinned as well.permissions: contents: readblock. Previously the workflow inherited the repo/org defaultGITHUB_TOKENscope. This job set only builds, lints and tests; it performs no writes (deploy to Clojars is a manualleintask, not CI-driven), so read-only is sufficient.Verified vulnerability classes
pull_request_targetchecking out untrusted code -- not present.${{ github.event.* }}inrun:steps -- not present.No behavior change
Each pinned SHA is the current tip of the version previously referenced:
actions/checkout->34e1148(v4.3.1)actions/cache->0057852(v4.3.0) and6f8efc2(v3.5.0)actions/setup-java->17f84c3(v3.14.1) and91d3aa4(v2.5.1)DeLaGuardo/setup-clojure->fa52269(3.7) and0fc99a3(12.1)Follow-up (not in this PR)
.github/dependabot.ymlwithpackage-ecosystem: github-actionswould keep these SHAs updated automatically.::set-outputusage (line ~47) should move to$GITHUB_OUTPUT; left out here to keep the diff security-scoped.Context
threatgrid/flandersis consumed by IROH as a dependency (iroh/project.clj:[threatgrid/flanders "1.1.0"]). This PR is filed as remediation for the PSIRT advisory; the CTIM library maintainers should confirm the version pins.🤖 Generated with Claude Code