VGT NullMark

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VGT NullMark

Invisible Watermark Detection & Privacy Sanitizer

LOCAL-FIRST · ZERO NETWORK · INVISIBLE UNICODE DETECTION · METADATA SCRUBBING · C2PA REMOVAL · RE-PARSE VERIFICATION

⚠️ BETA SOFTWARE — NOT INDEPENDENTLY AUDITED

VGT NullMark 1.0.0-beta.2 is a functional beta. It has not received an independent cryptographic or security audit.

NullMark reports only deterministic, explicitly implemented, auditable rules. It never converts an unknown vendor state into a false verified clean claim. Statistical watermarks (e.g. SynthID) are explicitly declared as not-verifiable-without-vendor-detector.

Found a vulnerability or have an improvement? Open an issue or contact us.

🔍 What is VGT NullMark?

NullMark is a hardened, local-first desktop application for detection, analysis and deterministic sanitization of invisible Unicode watermarks, tracker payloads, sensitive metadata and active provenance manifests (C2PA) from texts, images and documents.

Conventional privacy tools:
  Cloud-based processing         → your data leaves the device
  Single-pass sanitization       → no verification of result
  No C2PA awareness              → AI provenance manifests survive
  No re-parse step               → residual markers go undetected
  False "100% clean" claims      → statistical watermarks ignored

VGT NullMark:
  100% local processing          → zero network access, zero telemetry
  3 sanitization modes           → Safe · Strict · Maximum
  9 file formats                 → PNG, JPEG, WebP, PDF, SVG, DOCX, XLSX, PPTX, ODT
  C2PA manifest removal          → caBX, APP11, RIFF, ZIP manifests
  Re-parse verification          → every result independently re-analyzed before export
  Honest scope declaration       → statistical signals declared, never falsely confirmed
  Rust core, no unsafe code      → #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
  4 whitelisted IPC commands     → no shell, no fs plugin, no HTTP plugin

🏛️ Architecture

graph TD
    A[Unvertrauenswürdige Eingabedaten] --> B[React 19 WebView Sandbox]
    B -->|Typed IPC / Bounded Base64| C[Tauri 2 IPC Boundary]
    C -->|Max 4 Whitelisted Commands| D[Rust Sanitizer Engine]
    D --> E[Format-spezifische Parser & Scrubbing]
    E --> F[In-Memory Re-Parse & Verifikation]
    F -->|Nur bei 0 Restbefunden| G[Export-Freigabe]

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              REACT 19 / TYPESCRIPT UI                    │
│   Text Workspace · Document Workspace · Split Diff       │
│   DE / EN · Risk Color Coding · Codepoint Inspector      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              TAURI 2 IPC BOUNDARY                        │
│   4 commands only · Bounded Base64 · No file paths      │
│   withGlobalTauri: false · freezePrototype: true         │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              RUST SANITIZER ENGINE                        │
│   #![forbid(unsafe_code)] · Edition 2021                 │
│                                                         │
│  ┌──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────────┐   │
│  │  Unicode │  Binary  │   PDF    │  Office / ODT  │   │
│  │  Engine  │  Parser  │  Engine  │  ZIP Engine    │   │
│  │  3 modes │PNG/JPEG  │  lopdf   │  DOCX/XLSX     │   │
│  │          │WebP/SVG  │          │  PPTX/ODT      │   │
│  └──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────────────┘   │
│                                                         │
│              IN-MEMORY RE-PARSE & VERIFY                 │
│        Export blocked until 0 residual findings          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

🛡️ Security Architecture

Least-Privilege IPC — 4 Commands Only

analyze_text(text: String)
sanitize_text(text: String, mode: String)
analyze_binary(payload_base64: String)
sanitize_binary(payload_base64: String)

No native file paths cross the IPC boundary. Only bounded bytes.

Disabled by Default

Plugin	Status
`plugin-fs` (Filesystem)	❌ Disabled
`plugin-shell` (Shell execution)	❌ Disabled
`plugin-http` (HTTP networking)	❌ Disabled
`plugin-opener` / `plugin-process`	❌ Disabled

Hardening Checklist

Control	Status
`#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` in Rust core	✅
`withGlobalTauri: false`	✅
`freezePrototype: true`	✅
No `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`	✅
No `eval()` / `new Function()`	✅
Strict CSP — `default-src 'none'`	✅
No remote scripts, fonts, CDNs	✅
No runtime command execution in network-facing services	✅
SHA-256 input/output fingerprints	✅
Automatic post-sanitization re-parse	✅
Source security gate (`npm run security:check`)	✅

CSP:

default-src 'none'; connect-src ipc: http://ipc.localhost;
font-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'

Run the security gate at any time:

npm run security:check

📦 Supported Formats

NullMark processes 9 file formats with native magic-byte signature verification.

Category	Format	Metadata Removed	C2PA
Text	TXT, MD, CSV, JSON, XML, YAML, HTML	Unicode payloads (plaintext extraction)	—
Raster Images	PNG	`tEXt`, `zTXt`, `iTXt`, `eXIf`, `tIME` chunks — strict CRC32 validation	`caBX` chunks
Raster Images	JPEG	EXIF (`0xE1`), XMP, IPTC/Photoshop (`0xED`), App segments, Comments — entropy scan after SOS, EOI validation	APP11 (`0xEB`) fragment chains
Raster Images	WebP	`EXIF`, `XMP` RIFF chunks — VP8X flag bitmask scrubbing, RIFF size correction	`C2PA` RIFF chunk
Documents	PDF	`/Info` dict, `/Metadata` XMP (doc + page), annotation identity fields (`/T`, `/M`, `/CreationDate`, `/NM`), `/JavaScript`, `/Launch`, `/OpenAction`, `/AA`	`AFRelationship /C2PA_Manifest` filespecs
Vector	SVG	`<metadata>`, XML comments, `<script>`, event attributes (`onclick` etc.), external URIs — Doctype discarded (XXE protection)	`c2pa:manifest`
Office	DOCX	`docProps/core.xml`, `custom.xml`, `app.xml`, `w:author`, `w:date`, `w:initials` — Unicode scrubbing in `word/document.xml`	`META-INF/content_credential.c2pa`
Office	XLSX	`docProps/`, `xl/comments.xml`, `xl/persons/person.xml` — Unicode scrubbing in `xl/sharedStrings.xml`	`META-INF/content_credential.c2pa`
Office	PPTX	`docProps/`, `ppt/commentAuthors.xml`, `ppt/authors.xml` — Unicode scrubbing in all `ppt/slides/slide*.xml`	`META-INF/content_credential.c2pa`
OpenDocument	ODT	`meta.xml`, `manifest.rdf` — canonical `mimetype` as uncompressed entry 0 verified	`META-INF/content_credential.c2pa`

🔤 Unicode Sanitization Modes

Input Codepoints
       │
       ├─► Safe     → Zero-width spaces, BOM, Tag chars, Soft hyphens
       │             (context-sensitive chars reported but kept)
       │
       ├─► Strict   → + Bidi controls/overrides/isolates, ZWJ/ZWNJ,
       │               Invisible math operators, Unusual spaces → ASCII space
       │
       └─► Maximum  → + Private-use area (PUA), Curly quotes → straight,
                       Dash variants → hyphen, Ellipsis → ...,
                       Fullwidth ASCII → standard ASCII

Unicode Rule Matrix

Codepoint	Name	Mode	Safe	Strict	Max
`U+200B`	Zero Width Space	Zero-width / High	🗑️	🗑️	🗑️
`U+FEFF`	BOM / Zero Width No-Break	Zero-width / High	🗑️	🗑️	🗑️
`U+2060`	Word Joiner	Zero-width / Medium	🗑️	🗑️	🗑️
`U+00AD`	Soft Hyphen	Invisible format / Medium	🗑️	🗑️	🗑️
`U+E0000..E007F`	Unicode Tag Characters	Tag / High	🗑️	🗑️	🗑️
`U+200C`, `U+200D`	ZWNJ / ZWJ	Zero-width / Medium	✅ Keep	🗑️	🗑️
`U+202A..202E`	Bidi Embeddings / Overrides	Bidi / High	✅ Keep	🗑️	🗑️
`U+2061..2064`	Invisible Math Operators	Invisible / Medium	✅ Keep	🗑️	🗑️
`U+00A0`, `U+2000..200A`	Non-Standard Spaces	Suspicious / Info	✅ Keep	🔄 →	🔄 →
`U+E000..F8FF`	Private Use Area (PUA)	PUA / High	✅ Keep	✅ Keep	🗑️
`U+2018..201D`	Typographic Quotes	Surface / Info	✅ Keep	✅ Keep	🔄 → `'` `"`
`U+2010..2015`, `U+2212`	Dash variants / Minus	Surface / Info	✅ Keep	✅ Keep	🔄 → `-`
`U+FF01..FF5E`	Fullwidth ASCII	Compat / Low	✅ Keep	✅ Keep	🔄 → ASCII

✅ Verification Guarantee

After every sanitization pass, NullMark re-parses the result entirely in memory.

Sanitize(input)
    │
    ▼
In-memory re-parse
    │
    ├─ 0 residual findings → Export unlocked ✅
    └─ Any finding remains → Export blocked ❌

Canonical idempotence: sanitize(sanitize(x)) == sanitize(x) with 0 residual findings.

Every operation produces:

SHA-256 fingerprint of input
SHA-256 fingerprint of sanitized output
Change ledger (max. 4,096 recorded operations)

🤖 AI Watermark Scope — Honest Declaration

Vendor / Method	NullMark Coverage
Explicit Unicode payloads	✅ Detected and removed (all modes)
C2PA provenance manifests	✅ Removed across all 9 formats
Document & image metadata	✅ Removed
Google SynthID Text	⚠️ Probabilistic token-sampling — no hidden Unicode. NullMark cannot prove removal without vendor detector.
OpenAI text watermarks	⚠️ Research-stage, not universally deployed. Maximum mode canonicalizes token surface but makes no statistical guarantee.
Anthropic / Claude	⚠️ No official public text-watermark specification found at Beta 1.0 research pass.

NullMark never outputs a false verified clean claim for statistical watermarks. Unknown vendor state is declared not-verifiable-without-vendor-detector.

⚙️ Resource Limits

Parameter	Limit	Protection
Max text input	8 MiB	UI freeze / string overflow prevention
Max file size (single)	32 MiB	Bounded IPC memory
Max batch volume	128 MiB / 50 files	Host memory exhaustion
ZIP decompression ceiling	128 MiB expanded / 4,096 entries	Zip bomb / recursion protection
PDF objects / stream buffer	100,000 objects / 128 MiB	PDF object flood protection
Finding aggregation	Max 8 positions per codepoint	O(1) memory on marker-flooded files
Diff change ledger	Max 4,096 operations	Render pipeline protection

🖥️ Desktop Interface

Workspace	Purpose
Text & Unicode	Direct text input / text files — Split Diff viewer, per-step change log, 1-click mode escalation
Documents & Media	Batch processing — up to 50 files, sequential verification, secure download

Internationalization: German and English (stored in localStorage).

Visual inspection: Risk color coding (High · Medium · Low · Info), codepoint display as U+XXXX, match counter and position display.

⚙️ Tech Stack

Component	Technology	Version
Native Core	Rust / Tauri 2	Edition 2021, MSRV 1.88+ · Tauri v2.11.5
UI	React, TypeScript, Vite	React 19 · TS 5.8 · Vite 8
XML / Streaming Parser	`quick-xml`	v0.41.0
PDF Engine	`lopdf` (zero-default-features)	v0.44.0
ZIP Engine	`zip` (deflate)	v8.6.0
Cryptographic Hashes	`sha2` (SHA-256)	v0.10.9
Checksums	`crc32fast`	v1.5.0

📋 Requirements

Platform	Requirement
Windows	Windows 10 / 11 x64 — Microsoft WebView2 Runtime, VC++ Redistributable
macOS	macOS 12+ — Apple Silicon or Intel x64
Linux	x86_64 / aarch64 — WebKitGTK 4.1+
Rust	1.95 or newer with Cargo
Node.js	20.19+ or 22.12+ (required by Vite 8)
Disk	~3 GiB for first build and dependencies

🚀 Build & Run

Windows

START_WINDOWS.cmd

Or manually:

npm ci --ignore-scripts
npm run security:check
npm run tauri:dev

Build installers (NSIS .exe + WiX .msi):

BUILD_WINDOWS.cmd

Artifacts land in src-tauri/target/release/bundle/.

macOS / Linux

npm install
npm run security:check
npm run tauri:dev

Build:

npm run tauri:build

Test Engine Core (without Tauri)

src-tauri/src/engine.rs has no external dependencies — test the sanitizer core standalone:

rustc --edition 2021 --test src-tauri/src/engine.rs -o nullmark-engine-tests
./nullmark-engine-tests

On Windows: TEST_ENGINE.cmd

🗂️ Project Layout

src/                              React/TypeScript renderer
  App.tsx                         Main UI
  lib/backend.ts                  Typed IPC boundary
src-tauri/
  src/engine.rs                   Engine boundary and invariants
  src/engine/                     Rules, model and sanitizer policies
  src-tauri/src/binary/           PNG/JPEG/WebP/PDF/SVG/Office/ODF parsers
  src/lib.rs                      Bounded Tauri command layer + verification
  permissions/                    Explicit custom-command permissions
  capabilities/                   Single-window least-privilege capability
  tauri.conf.json                 CSP and desktop configuration
scripts/security-check.mjs        Source/config security gate
docs/                             Architecture and threat model
ROADMAP.md                        Versioned future work and acceptance gates
.github/                          CI, Dependabot and PR policy

📚 Documentation

Document	Link
Technical Data Sheet	`docs/TECHNICAL_DATASHEET.md`
Binary Format Specification	`docs/FORMAT_SPECIFICATION.md`
Threat Model	`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
Security Audit Report	`docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md`
Watermark Research	`docs/WATERMARK_RESEARCH.md`
Reproducibility Guide	`docs/REPRODUCIBILITY.md`
Benchmark Results	`docs/BENCHMARK_RESULTS.md`
Roadmap	`ROADMAP.md`

🚧 Known Limitations (Beta 1.0)

Regular PDF attachments preserved — JavaScript/launch/automatic actions removed, unrelated embedded files not silently deleted
Office transformations target metadata and supported authorship fields — macros and arbitrary embedded objects not processed
Statistical AI watermarks (SynthID etc.) not provably removable — declared honestly, never falsely confirmed
Container metadata reveals: original filename, size, creation time, suite, algorithms, public-key hashes, offline factor presence

🗺️ Roadmap — Beta 2

Feature	Status
Exact split diff and bounded change ledger	🔜 Beta 2
XLSX / PPTX / SVG support	✅ Done (beta.2)
Deeper PDF object inspection	🔜 Beta 2
German / English interface catalogs	✅ Done (beta.2)
Restrained desktop UI with project-owned SVG identity	🔜 Beta 2

🔗 VGT Ecosystem

Tool	Type	Purpose
🧹 VGT NullMark	Privacy Sanitizer	Watermark detection and metadata scrubbing — you are here
🧠 VGT AETHEL	Sovereign AI OS	Local AI intelligence OS with operator governance
🛡️ VGT GeDefense	Linux Security Fabric	Kernel-near defense, XDR, encrypted evidence
🔑 VGT Infinity	PQ File Encryption	Post-quantum file vault
⚔️ VGT Sentinel	WAF / IDS	Zero-Trust WordPress WAF
⚡ VGT Auto-Punisher	IDS	L4+L7 Hybrid IDS
🌐 GaiaCom	Communication	Post-quantum federated E2EE platform
📊 VGT Dattrack	Analytics	Sovereign local analytics

💙 Support the Mission

Method	Address
PayPal	paypal.me/dergoldenelotus
Bitcoin	`bc1q3ue5gq822tddmkdrek79adlkm36fatat3lz0dm`
ETH / USDT (ERC-20)	`0xD37DEfb09e07bD775EaaE9ccDaFE3a5b2348Fe85`

📄 License

Enterprise deployments, TIER-0 audits (VGT SafetySys™) and commercial support: visiongaiatechnology.de

VISIONGAIATECHNOLOGY – WE ARCHITECT THE FUTURE OF SECURITY.

VGT NullMark 1.0.0-beta.2 — Invisible Unicode Detection · C2PA Removal · Metadata Scrubbing · 9 File Formats · Safe/Strict/Maximum Modes · Re-Parse Verification · Rust/Tauri 2 · Zero Network · Local-First · AGPLv3 · Windows / macOS / Linux

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
docs		docs
fixtures		fixtures
scripts		scripts
src-tauri		src-tauri
src		src
BUILD_STATUS.md		BUILD_STATUS.md
BUILD_WINDOWS.cmd		BUILD_WINDOWS.cmd
CHANGELOG.md		CHANGELOG.md
CONTRIBUTING.md		CONTRIBUTING.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
README.md		README.md
ROADMAP.md		ROADMAP.md
SECURITY.md		SECURITY.md
SHA256SUMS.txt		SHA256SUMS.txt
START_WINDOWS.cmd		START_WINDOWS.cmd
TEST_ENGINE.cmd		TEST_ENGINE.cmd
index.html		index.html
package-lock.json		package-lock.json
package.json		package.json
tsconfig.json		tsconfig.json
vite.config.ts		vite.config.ts

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VGT NullMark

Invisible Watermark Detection & Privacy Sanitizer

⚠️ BETA SOFTWARE — NOT INDEPENDENTLY AUDITED

🔍 What is VGT NullMark?

🏛️ Architecture

🛡️ Security Architecture

Least-Privilege IPC — 4 Commands Only

Disabled by Default

Hardening Checklist

📦 Supported Formats

🔤 Unicode Sanitization Modes

Unicode Rule Matrix

✅ Verification Guarantee

🤖 AI Watermark Scope — Honest Declaration

⚙️ Resource Limits

🖥️ Desktop Interface

⚙️ Tech Stack

📋 Requirements

🚀 Build & Run

Windows

macOS / Linux

Test Engine Core (without Tauri)

🗂️ Project Layout

📚 Documentation

🚧 Known Limitations (Beta 1.0)

🗺️ Roadmap — Beta 2

🔗 VGT Ecosystem

💙 Support the Mission

📄 License

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VGT NullMark

Invisible Watermark Detection & Privacy Sanitizer

⚠️ BETA SOFTWARE — NOT INDEPENDENTLY AUDITED

🔍 What is VGT NullMark?

🏛️ Architecture

🛡️ Security Architecture

Least-Privilege IPC — 4 Commands Only

Disabled by Default

Hardening Checklist

📦 Supported Formats

🔤 Unicode Sanitization Modes

Unicode Rule Matrix

✅ Verification Guarantee

🤖 AI Watermark Scope — Honest Declaration

⚙️ Resource Limits

🖥️ Desktop Interface

⚙️ Tech Stack

📋 Requirements

🚀 Build & Run

Windows

macOS / Linux

Test Engine Core (without Tauri)

🗂️ Project Layout

📚 Documentation

🚧 Known Limitations (Beta 1.0)

🗺️ Roadmap — Beta 2

🔗 VGT Ecosystem

💙 Support the Mission

📄 License

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